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INTRODUCTION
The international community has witnessed unprecedented
incidents of piracy with increasingly blatant, sophisticated, daring,
1
brazen, unrelenting, seemingly intractable, and audacious threats to
2
international law, security at sea, and global trade. These incidents
have frequently occurred in parts of the world where lawlessness
prevails on land and spills into the sea, due in part to failures of the
3
state. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
the number of acts of piracy and armed robberies perpetrated against
ships reached 5062 by June, 2009, up 36 since May, 2009, with most
4
incidents occurring off the coast of Africa. With the exception of
2005, the number of piracy incidents has increased dramatically each
5
year. On January 16, 2009, the International Maritime Bureau

1. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, Preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008)
(“Pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia have become more sophisticated and daring
and have expanded in their geographic scope, notably evidenced by the hijacking of
the M/V Sirius Star 500 nautical miles off the coast of Kenya and subsequent
unsuccessful attempts well east of Tanzania.”).
2. International
Maritime
Organization,
Introduction
to
IMO,
http://www.imo.org/about/mainframe.asp?topic_id=3 (last visited June 3, 2010)
(reporting that approximately ninety percent of world trade is conducted through
maritime channels); see Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and
Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 16 (2007)
(reasoning that states are likely to continue to regard pirates as global outlaws due to
the importance of maritime channels to world trade).
3. ICC Commercial Crime Services, International Chamber of Commerce, Pirate
Attacks Off Somalia Already Surpass 2008 Figures, May 12, 2009, http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pirate-attacks-offsomalia-already-surpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 (reporting that the
total number of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Somalia
for the first four months of 2009 surpassed the figure for all of 2008). In all of 2008,
there were 111 incidents, including the hijacking of 42 vessels. Id. However, in the
first four months of 2009 alone, there were 29 successful hijackings out of 114
attempted attacks. Id. Furthermore, in 2008, 815 crewmembers were taken hostage
in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Somalia. Id. In the first four months of
2009, the number of hostages had already reached 478. Id. Incidents increased in
spite of the heightened presence of international navies sweeping the waters off the
Somali coast. Id. The level of attempted attacks showed that the pirates were
unperturbed by this presence and, if anything, had stepped up operations in order to
secure a higher success rate. Id.
4. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST
SHIPS: ACTS REPORTED DURING JUNE 2009 (MSC.4/Circ.138) ¶ 2 (Jul. 7, 2009),
available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D25980/
138.pdf.
5. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST
SHIPS: ANNUAL REPORT 2005 (MSC.4/Circ.81) ¶ 4 (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter IMO
ANNUAL REPORT 2005], available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/
data_id%3D14323/81-colour.pdf (stating that the number of incidents “reported to
the Organization to have occurred or to have been attempted in 2005, was 266, a
decrease of 64 (19%) over the figure for 2004”). In 2005, the IMO reported that
“[o]ver the period under review . . . [t]here was an increase in the number of
incidents from 13 to 49 in East Africa and from 41 to 51 in the Indian Ocean, over
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(IMB) reported an unprecedented 11% increase in the number of
incidents of piracy or armed robbery at sea committed worldwide
6
between 2007 and 2008. Of the 293 incidents that the IMB recorded
for that year, 111 (38%) occurred off the coast of Somalia or in the
7
Gulf of Aden.
Meanwhile, navies have been deployed, and some captured pirates
have been sent to third-party countries to be prosecuted, but most
8
have been released. Two issues have emerged from the current
situation. How should nations deal with the piracy problem in
general? What rights does international law grant to a suspected
pirate? The U.N. Security Council is concerned that Somalia’s lack of
a domestic legal structure to deal with piracy has “hindered more
robust international action against the pirates off the coast of
Somalia” and has “led to pirates being released without facing
9
justice.”
Somalia’s responsibility for creating a framework is
underscored by the Security Council’s note that
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation provides for parties to create
criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of
persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising
control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of
10
intimidation.

Available statistics underscore the magnitude and consequences of
this legal labyrinth. Official figures released by the U.S. Navy indicate
that out of the 238 suspected pirates investigated by navies operating
off the coasts of Somalia, barely half were prosecuted, and most were

the 2004 figures.” Id. ¶ 5. Moreover, while the IMO observed a “decrease of 25 (9%)
over the figure for 2005,” the organization indicated in its 2007 annual report that
there was an “increase of 41 (17%) over the figure for 2006.” Compare INT’L
MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:
ANNUAL REPORT 2006 (MSC.4/Circ.98) ¶ 4 (Apr. 13, 2007) [hereinafter IMO ANNUAL
REPORT 2006], available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/
data_id%3D18566/98.pdf, with INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND
ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: ANNUAL REPORT 2007 (MSC.4/Circ.115) ¶ 4 (Apr. 10,
2008) [hereinafter IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2007], available at http://www.imo.org/
includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D22585/115.pdf.
6. ICC Commercial Crime Services, International Chamber of Commerce, IMB
Reports Unprecedented Rise in Maritime Hijackings, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:imb-reports-unprecedentedrise-in-maritime-hijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51.
7. Id.
8. See Jon Ungoed-Thomas & Marie Woolf, Navy Releases Somali Pirates Caught
Red-Handed, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 29, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/africa/article6936318.ece (observing that pirates captured by the Royal Navy
were often released because they were not captured “in the act of piracy”).
9. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1.
10. Id. (abbreviation omitted).
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11

released. In April, 2008, after North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) forces rescued twenty fishermen from pirates who seized a
Belgian ship, the forces had to release the pirates because they had
12
no legal authority to arrest them. It is clear that no nation seems
13
Pirates,
interested in playing the role of “global policeman.”
particularly those operating off the coast of Somalia, have shown
utter disregard for the law, largely because existing enforcement
mechanisms have been deficient and the international community
has not demonstrated a resolute will to reform piracy law.
When ransoms are paid to pirates or when captured pirates are
released, the international community inadvertently encourages the
persistence of piracy with impunity, and it is “unlikely that piracy can
14
be stopped if pirates are not prosecuted and punished.” Faced with
a new generation of pirates, it is not longer sufficient to simply appeal
to universal jurisdiction. Whether a pirate can be prosecuted
depends on where the pirate is captured, the nationality of the pirate,
the nationality of the ship that arrests him, and the circumstances
15
under which the pirate is arrested. These circumstances call into
question the adequacy of enforcement mechanisms currently in place
to combat international piracy, as there have been few normative and
procedural developments. Many of these challenges are rooted in
the definition of piracy in international instruments, the level of
international will to enforce piracy law, and the jurisdictional
16
limitations of prosecuting piracy.
The legal regime currently in
place under both international and domestic criminal law is not
17
sufficiently comprehensive to properly hold pirates responsible.
Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) mandates that nations utilize universal jurisdiction to

11. Oliver Hawkins, What To Do With A Captured Pirate, BBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7932205.stm.
12. Todd Pitman & Katharine Houreld, NATO Forces Free 20 Fishermen; Sea Bandits
Seize Belgian Ship, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2009, at A3.
13. Eugene Kontorovich, Opinion, Invoke Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Pirates
Worldwide, NAT’L. L. J., May 11, 2009, at 17.
14. Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm.
15. Hawkins, supra note 11.
16. See Donald R. Rothwell, Maritime Piracy and International Law, Crimes of
War Project, Feb. 24, 2009, http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-piracy.html
(arguing that the legal definition of piracy should be revised and that the
international community should work together to formulate a coordinated approach
to piracy).
17. See id. (noting that some states’ criminal justice systems are not equipped to
adequately deal with piracy).
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18

prosecute pirates on the high seas, few nations have actually done
19
so. When the responsibility to prosecute belongs to every state, the
practical effect is that no state seems to accept it, apart from those
20
states that have immediate national interests at stake.
As pirates become more violent and audacious, the international
21
response has been to send more navies to the effected region. In
the short term, the presence of ships increases the speed with which
pirates can be caught or dissuaded, but in the long term, the ships
22
may prove to be insufficient, risky, and, at best, only an ad hoc
23
solution.
In fact, in October, 2009, it was acknowledged that
“[a]lthough the international naval forces have stepped up patrols in
the Gulf of Aden this year, relatively few of the pirates detained have
24
faced trial because of the legal complexities involved.”
Granted, international navies have had some success in containing
piracy, especially off the coast of Somalia where warships established
a safe shipping lane and escorted ships with food aid into the
25
country. Some have suggested that the long-term solution to piracy
near Somalia is an effective government coupled with a well-

18. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 105, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
19. See Kontorovich, supra note 14 (explaining that states have been hesitant to
exercise jurisdiction over pirates due to the difficulties and expenses associated with
prosecution).
20. See id. (highlighting the fact that most instances of military action against
pirates have been defensive acts).
21. See Pirates Hit Navy Ship ‘In Error’, BBC NEWS, Oct. 7, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8294858.stm (documenting the increased
presence of naval ships from Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in waters adjacent
to Somalia).
22. For example, pirates threatened to “execute the whole crew,” of a Chinese
vessel—the De Xin Hai—if the Chinese Navy tried to rescue the crew rather than pay
a ransom.
China Vows to Free Hijacked Ship, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8315630.stm.
23. In fact, pirates are becoming more ubiquitous and evasive of navies in their
operations. Somali Pirates Snare Chinese Ship, Crew, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2009, at
A3. They use sophisticated equipment and so-called larger “mother ships” to enable
them to strike hundreds of miles offshore. Id. A recent example involved the
aforementioned Chinese cargo ship De Xin Hai, which Somali pirates attacked in the
Indian Ocean about 700 miles (1100 kilometers) east of the Somali coastline, the
farthest from shore pirates have ever struck. Id.
24. Pirates Hit Navy Ship ‘In Error’, supra note 21.
25. Paul Reynolds, Rules Frustrate Anti-Piracy Efforts, BBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7735144.stm. Several other success stories have been
reported: “The Royal Navy . . . shot and killed two pirates and captured others. The
French staged a daring capture of pirates who had taken over a yacht. The Indian
navy thwarted two attempted hijacks, though the pirates in both cases got away.” Id.
Additionally, the U.S. Navy successfully rescued a ship captain, and in the process
killed three pirates and captured a fourth. US Captain Rescued From Pirates, BBC
NEWS, Apr. 13, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7996087.stm.
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resourced coast guard.
Others have proposed that western
countries deploy their navies to the area, but this prospect is unlikely
because those countries have no legal obligation to assist the
27
international community in such a manner.
Alternatively, some
argue that commercial ships should be able to arm themselves in
order to adequately respond to increasingly well-armed pirates, but
28
this proposal has also been discouraged.
In the end, no single
country’s navy can be relied upon to constitute an international naval
police force. Even if one nation were to take on that responsibility, it
is extremely difficult to effectively police the entire Indian Ocean, to
say nothing of other parts of the globe where piracy is prevalent. For
the most part, states have limited their actions to negotiating with
pirates in exchange for the release of hostages, but have gone no
29
further.
International law enforcement—even if only complementary to
national and regional efforts—is particularly helpful in cases where
piracy occurs in waters off the coasts of developing countries where
30
local law enforcement is nominal, nonexistent, or ineffective.
Indeed, the IMB attributes the rise in incidents of piracy, in part, to
31
“the lack of proper law enforcement.”

26. See Hawkins, supra note 11 (forewarning that until a solution is found,
holding pirates accountable will be difficult).
27. See Kontorovich, supra note 13 (recognizing that few countries want to play
the role of “global policeman”).
28. The IMO argues that “[c]arriage of arms on board ship may encourage
attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an already dangerous situation, and any
firearms on board may themselves become an attractive target for an attacker.” INT’L
MARITIME ORG., PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: GUIDANCE TO SHIPOWNERS
AND SHIP OPERATORS, SHIPMASTERS AND CREWS ON PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING ACTS
OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS (MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3) Annex, ¶ 46
(May 29, 2002).
29. The IMO has stated: “As these [pirates] are criminals under both
international law and most national laws, this task will generally fall to the security
forces of the States involved. Governments should avoid engaging in negotiations
with these criminals and seek to bring perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery
against ships to justice. Negotiating with criminals in a case regarding hijacking of a
ship may encourage potential perpetrators to seek economic revenue through
piracy.” INT’L MARITIME ORG., PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS FOR PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING PIRACY AND
ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS (MSC.1/Circ.1333) Annex, ¶ 2 (June 26, 2009).
30. See Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, An Examination of the Evolution of
Crimes at Sea and the Emergence of the Many Legal Regimes in Their Wake, 34 N.C. J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 521, 524 (2009) (citing INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:
ANNUAL REPORT—2007, at 24 (2008) [hereinafter IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2007]
(predicting that the only way to prevent additional acts of piracy is through the
intervention of the international community).
31. IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supra note 30, at 24.
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The United Nations has responded with ad hoc resolutions to help
address the law enforcement lacuna. For instance, a provision in the
UNCLOS prohibits states from engaging in the hot pursuit of
32
suspected pirates in the territorial waters of another coastal state.
Provisions such as this one illustrate how the UNCLOS is premised
upon a traditional understanding of piracy—one that assumes that
the state system works effectively and that a state can enforce its own
33
laws in its territorial sea. However, as recent events demonstrate,
this is often not the case.
Pirates have become organized,
34
technologically advanced, and versatile —a development that
explodes traditional understandings of piracy. Hence, there is an
urgency for international law to more adequately respond to this
formidable phenomenon that has evolved in nature and scope. Ad
hoc U.N. Resolutions have proven to be temporary and limited in
their long-term effectiveness because they apply only in a given
35
situation.
Another misguided response has been the over-reliance on third
36
states (those not directly involved) to prosecute suspected pirates.
This practice, however, is a subject of concern because of due process
37
issues prevalent in these third states. What constraints are faced by
third states—which rarely have a large stake in maritime trade—when
it comes to prosecution of pirates?
As long as pirates perceive that the international community is
unwilling or lacking the capacity to prosecute, piracy will continue to
thrive. It is evident that piracy threatens international trade and
maritime life throughout the world. Not only does piracy cause
substantial disruption and loss to the world economy, which is heavily
reliant on maritime shipping, it also leads to escalating costs
associated with increasingly steep ransom demands and higher

32. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 111, ¶ 3.
33. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (explaining that international piracy law tasks
countries with policing acts of piracy in their own territorial waters).
34. Saeed Ahmed, High-Tech Pirates Are No Romantic Figures, CNN.COM, April 29,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/29/pirates/index.html.
Pirates
charge against or escape from their targets using high-speed vessels linked to a
special mother vessel. Id. They wear night-vision goggles, carry rocket launchers,
and use global-positioning devices for navigation. Id.
35. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (criticizing the fact that the U.N. Security
Council’s Resolutions only dealt with piracy in Somali waters).
36. See Hawkins, supra note 11 (discussing agreements entered into by Kenya and
both the United States and the European Union which provide that Kenya will
prosecute pirates).
37. See id. (discussing concerns raised by human rights groups as to the adequacy
of Kenya’s justice system).
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insurance premiums. This Article recommends various normative
and procedural reforms and, in particular, advocates for the
expansion of the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal on the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) as a permanent forum for the prosecution of
suspected pirates.
To this end, the Article consists of six parts. Part I evaluates the
common practice of outsourcing piracy enforcement and the various
legal and non-legal problems that follow as a result of such practice.
Part II analyzes the definition of piracy in the context of international
law instruments and addresses the relevant jurisdictional implications
of that definition. Part III focuses on the response of the United
Nations to piracy, and, in particular, the U.N. Security Council’s
efforts in Africa. Part IV discusses the ITLOS and the respective roles
that international jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction play in the
prosecution of piracy. Part V looks at the methods by which piracy
law is enforced on both national and local levels, with special
attention to Somalia. Lastly, Part VI recommends that particular
areas of piracy law be expanded, and ultimately calls for broader
approaches to the problem in order to build a more robust system of
enforcement.
I.

OUTSOURCING PIRACY LAW ENFORCEMENT

Under the existing legal framework, piracy is uniquely situated in
international law. When a pirate is captured on the high seas outside
the territory of a particular state, the municipal laws of the capturing
state—not international laws—determine how the pirate will be
39
punished.
This reliance on municipal enforcement has led to
notable failures, one being the rarity in which piracy cases are
38. There is no quantitative research available regarding the total cost of global
piracy, and estimates vary widely. Stephanie Hanson, Combating Maritime Piracy,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Jan. 7, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/
18376/. Experts disagree over whether insurance premiums, freight rates, and
rerouting costs should be considered together with the cost of ransoms. Id. Some
analysts suggest that global piracy costs $1 billion a year, while others estimate the
cost to be as high as $16 billion. Id.
39. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 105 (“On the high seas, or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or
a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the
persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out
the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine
the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the
rights of third parties acting in good faith.”). But see Michael H. Passman, Protections
Afforded to Captured Pirates Under the Law of War and International Law, 33 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 1, 10–11 (2008) (“Although pirates are punished under the municipal law of the
state that holds them, their capture outside the jurisdiction of a state is made possible
by international law”).
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actually brought in municipal courts. For example, in 2009, a U.S.
District Court tried a suspected pirate involved in the dramatic
hijacking of the M/V Maersk Alabama—the first piracy prosecution in
40
the United States since the late 19th century. The rarity of such
cases highlights the complete failure of international law as a
response to piracy. Although hundreds of pirates have been caught
by the coalition led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) that patrolled the Gulf of Aden, only a few have been
41
brought back to the capturing nation to be prosecuted. One Danish
frigate, after seizing a pirate vessel, released the pirates shortly
42
afterward, claiming that it did not know what to do with them. In
another case, the Royal Navy released pirates after confiscating their
43
equipment.
There are several explanations for the failure to bring pirates to
justice. Not only is prosecuting pirates burdensome, entailing
innumerable logistical difficulties, it is also expensive and time44
intensive as it can involve novel legal questions. Additionally, some
states are reluctant to prosecute pirates because their legal regimes
are inadequate or because piracy presents delicate political
45
considerations. Although these obstacles are not insurmountable,
they still effectively deter states from prosecuting pirates, particularly
46
when states are not immediately affected by piracy.
A. Obstacles to Working with Third Countries
One of the responses to the challenges of enforcement of piracy
law has been to enter into agreements with third countries, mainly
47
developing countries, to prosecute suspected pirates. While there
48
are doubts about the long-term sustainability of this approach, there
are also legal concerns. For instance, “[t]he legality of transfers from
outside capturing states to third states is thrown into doubt by the
49
piracy provisions of [the UNCLOS].” The drafting history reveals
40. Kontorovich, supra note 13; see also Hicks v. Waterman S.S. Corp., No. H-091601, 2009 WL 4572776 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2009).
41. Kontorovich, supra note 13.
42. See Hawkins, supra note 11 (noting the Danish Foreign Ministry’s opinion
that they could not try the pirates domestically).
43. Id.
44. Kontorovich, supra note 13.
45. Rothwell, supra note 16.
46. Kontorovich, supra note 15.
47. See Hawkins, supra note 11 (noting agreements entered into the United
States, the European Union, and Kenya, for Kenya to accept pirates for prosecution).
48. See id. (questioning how long Kenya will continue to accept jurisdiction).
49. Kontorovich, supra note 14; see UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 105 (providing
that “every State may seize a pirate ship” on the high seas, but that prosecution of
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that this provision was intended to preclude transfers to third states.
In an effort to deal with piracy off the coast of Somalia, Resolution
1851 authorizes “shiprider” agreements to facilitate more effective
51
law enforcement capability. The Resolution states that the purpose
of these agreements is to “facilitate the investigation and prosecution
of persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this
Resolution for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
52
Somalia.”
The resolution also addresses several issues related to
piracy prosecution, stating that agreements may be made,
provided that the advance consent of the [Transitional Federal
Government] is obtained for the exercise of third state jurisdiction
by shipriders in Somali territorial waters and that such agreements
or arrangements do not prejudice the effective implementation of
the [1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
53
the Safety of Maritime Navigation] Convention.

U.N. Member States are bound to carry out the decisions of the
54
U.N. Security Council, a body that has power to modify obligations
55
under the UNCLOS. Pursuant to the foregoing Security Council
resolution, the European Union signed an agreement with Kenya for
56
Nairobi to prosecute suspected pirates captured by E.U. vessels. The
adjudicatory effectiveness of an arrangement such as this, however,
can hinge on economic, judicial, legal, and even political factors.
The legal systems of some countries only provide for personal or

suspected pirates should be conducted by the “courts of the State which carried out
the seizure”).
50. See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 9 at 29, U.N. Doc. A/3150 (Apr. 23–July 4, 1956)
[hereinafter ILC REPORT 1956] (“This article gives any State the right to seize pirate
ships . . . and to have them adjudicated upon by its courts. This right cannot be
exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another State.”).
51. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1, ¶ 5.
52. Id. ¶ 3.
53. Id.
54. U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.”).
55. See id. art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail.”).
56. Katharine Houreld, Piracy Suspects Appear in Kenya Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
24, 2009, at A7. Currently, Kenyan Courts are prosecuting suspected pirates sent to
them by Germany, Britain and France. Id. Western nations are often reluctant to try
Somali suspects who might try to claim asylum. See Ungoed-Thomas & Woolf, supra
note 8 (suggesting that the Royal Navy releases pirates to avoid asylum claims that
might arise if the pirates are prosecuted in Europe).
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57

national criminal jurisdiction. Thus, a country’s ability to prosecute
arrested pirates depends on its own laws. This was the problem that
the Danish Navy faced when it captured the flagship Absalon and
detained ten suspected armed pirates in the seas off Somalia after
58
they had allegedly attacked merchant ships that were not Danish.
The Danish authorities had nowhere to take them because Denmark
could only exercise national criminal jurisdiction if the pirates had
attacked a Danish ship or Danish citizens; thus, Denmark was barred
59
from prosecuting.
Instead, Denmark looked to other states to
conduct the prosecution, but more complications arose, such as
60
insufficient evidence for those states to convict.
As a result,
Denmark had no choice but to release the pirates off the shore of
61
Somalia.
Kenya and Puntland have recently been designated as the prime
62
destinations for piracy prosecution. But there are doubts that Kenya
can handle the costly and complicated task of trying cases that
emerge from the exploding piracy crisis, because the country
63
continues to struggle with its own backlog of criminal and civil cases.
Other nations have even handed over captured pirates to the
internationally unrecognized breakaway state of Puntland, located in
64
North Eastern Somalia, for prosecution. Most of the pirates sent to
Puntland came from Puntland, and it is unclear how long the pirates
would actually stay in prison if they were convicted and sentenced in
65
that state. According to experts, a pirate’s stay in a Puntland prison
is often brief because criminals there are able to either walk out or
66
bribe officials for their release. Nonetheless, forty-five of the fifty57. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (explaining that international piracy law does not
usually extend to offshore attacks).
58. Hawkins, supra note 11.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. (reporting Kenya’s agreement with the United States and the
European Union to try pirates in its courts).
63. See id. (reiterating sentiments that the Kenyan justice system is corrupt and
unfair).
64. Id. Somalia is currently split into several parts. Reynolds, supra note 25. The
capital, Mogadishu, is nominally under the control of a transitional government. Id.
The breakaway Islamist group al-Shabab controls most of the south and central areas
of the country. Id. The pirates, however, are based further north in Puntland, a
semi-autonomous region, with the main pirate base in the port of Eyl. Id.
Somaliland is around the coast, and is currently seeking independence. Id. In light
of these developments, the chances that the world will soon see a peaceful and
united Somalia are stark.
65. Hawkins, supra note 11.
66. Id.; see also Reynolds, supra note 25 (“There is a president [of Puntland] but
he has either no power or no interest in stopping a lucrative form of income. It is

ISANGA.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX (DO NOT DELETE)

1278

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/17/2010 6:45 PM

[Vol. 59:1267

seven pirates caught by the French Navy during recent operations
67
have been transferred to Puntland authorities. The U.S. Navy also
sent nine pirates to Puntland, which means that Puntland accounted
for nearly half of the pirates reported to be facing prosecution in the
68
region.
B. Jurisdictional Constraints
Amidst the transfer of pirates to third countries, jurisdictional
questions have inevitably surfaced. For example, in Hassan M. Ahmed
69
v. Republic of Kenya, the suspected pirates attacked an Indian
70
merchant ship 275–280 miles off the Somali coast in January, 2006.
After the U.S. Navy captured the suspects aboard an Indian dhow,
71
they transferred them to Kenyan authorities for prosecution. At the
time, the U.N. Security Council had not yet passed the resolution that
would authorize the lawful extradition of piracy suspects to third
72
countries for prosecution. Still, the court invoked the UNCLOS and
universal jurisdiction under customary international law as the basis
73
for its jurisdiction. The defense argued that the Kenyan court had
no jurisdiction to hear the matter because the suspects were arrested
in Somalia’s 200-nautical-mile territorial sea, and submitted that the
74
proper venue for the trial would be Somalia or India. The basis of
this contention was that none of the parties involved were Kenyan,
thus ruling out personal jurisdiction, and that the offense was
committed miles away from the Kenyan coast, thus ruling out
75
territorial jurisdiction.
The Kenyan court considered these
76
arguments, but ultimately rejected the defense’s appeal. With the
requisite legislation, Kenyan courts could prosecute piracy through
the principle of universal jurisdiction, which would grant them

believed that the money gained from ransom is more than the income of the local
government of Puntland.”).
67. Hawkins, supra note 11.
68. Id.
69. (2009) eKLR (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
70. Id. at 1–2.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Resolution 1851 was passed in December, 2008. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1.
73. Ahmed, eKLR at 7.
74. Piracy
Suspects
Challenge
Court,
NEWS24.COM,
Feb.
6,
2006,
http://www.news24.com/Content/Africa/News/965/5db1f9fef91244e8aa62aa5cc95
bdd0e/06-02-2006-03-04/Piracy_suspects_challenge_court.
75. Ahmed, eKLR at 5.
76. Id. at 7.
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competence to try pirates even if the pirates were captured by
77
another state.
However, a close reading of the UNCLOS indicates that customary
international law does not establish universal jurisdiction in cases of
extradition, and that such jurisdiction would be contrary to the terms
of the treaty which provide that the capturing country should carry
78
out the prosecution.
Indeed, some countries might even be in
breach of their international obligations if they extradite suspected
pirates to other countries if it is likely that the receiving country will
79
violate the pirate’s human rights. The commentary for Article 43 of
the UNCLOS provides that the article gives “any State the right to
seize pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and to have them
adjudicated upon by its courts,” but this right is not transferrable to
80
another state.
This provision articulates universal jurisdiction
insofar as it permits any state that seizes pirates on the high seas to
81
subject the pirates to prosecution in a state’s domestic courts. The
provision does not, however, permit that state to try pirates if it
82
captures them in the territorial waters of another state. Piracy, as
defined in the UNCLOS, must occur on the high seas, outside the
83
jurisdiction of any single state.
Thus, unless a state’s legislation
explicitly provides for piracy as such, it will not be punishable under
84
its domestic law.
C. Contending with Unreliable Courts
The use of third countries in the prosecution of suspected pirates
raises both due process and long-term sustainability concerns
77. See generally Kontorovich, supra note 13 (explaining that the legal concept of
universal jurisdiction allows any nation to prosecute pirates).
78. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 105 (“On the high seas, or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or
a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the
persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the
seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the
action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights
of third parties acting in good faith.” (emphasis added)).
79. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (ser. A) (1989).
Soering resisted extradition to the United States—which permits the imposition of
the death penalty and the “death row phenomenon”—on the ground that the
United Kingdom would be violating its obligations under the European Convention
on Human Rights regarding the prohibition of inhumane or degrading treatment.
Id. at 30–31. The European Court of Human Rights agreed. Id. at 50.
80. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, at 29.
81. Id.
82. See id. (requiring seizure to occur outside the jurisdiction of a state).
83. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 101.
84. Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and
Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257, 264 (2002).

ISANGA.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX (DO NOT DELETE)

1280

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/17/2010 6:45 PM

[Vol. 59:1267

regarding whether the process guarantees fair procedures. Can
Kenyan courts, for example, act as an effective default tribunal for
the prosecution of pirates, or are they being used on a merely ad hoc
85
basis? From a procedural standpoint, are they sufficiently equipped
86
Some have observed that the Kenyan courts have
for the task?
87
“scant judicial resources” and a huge “backlog of cases.” For these
reasons, and in consideration of the international ramifications at
stake, piracy cases ought to be tried in courts that are sufficiently
equipped to handle piracy cases.
The Kenyan judiciary itself is rife with problems, as judges operate
under either a cloud of corruption or a lack of independence. For
example, in 2005, the International Commission of Jurists reported
that in Kenya, “five out of nine Court of Appeal justices, 18 out of 36
High Court justices and 82 out of 254 magistrates were implicated as
corrupt,” and noted that judicial corruption has severely impeded
88
development of the rule of law in Kenya. Corruption in the Kenyan
89
judiciary is persistent, endemic, and quite intractable. During a visit
to Kenya in August, 2009, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham
Clinton, acknowledged the shortcomings in Kenya’s judiciary by
using a phrase commonly heard in Kenya: “Why hire a lawyer when
90
you can buy a judge.”
If the national courts of countries that
capture suspected pirates will not prosecute them, and if outsourcing
that responsibility to third countries is problematic, then the
responsibility of resolving piracy is left to the international
community, and its use of international law, to try to resolve the issue.
First among the efforts of the international community must be an
examination of the adequacy of the existing legal framework.

85. See Robert Marquand, Sticky Legal Battles Await for Captured Somali Pirates,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14, 2009, at 5–6 (noting that “Mombasa [was] acting as
a kind of Hague international tribunal for pirate crime”).
86. See Bahar, supra note 2, at 81 (explaining that in many Kenyan courts,
magistrates must transcribe the testimony of witnesses by hand and prosecutors tend
to lack the requisite time and resources to effectively prosecute cases).
87. Id.
88. INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, KENYA: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, CORRUPTION AND
REFORM 3–4 (2005).
89. See id. at 3 (raising the concern that although many of the judges who were
implicated as corrupt had resigned, those taking over the vacated positions may have
been selected based on political, tribal, or sectarian connections).
90. Clinton in Kenya Urges a Cleanup of Corruption, CNN.COM, Aug. 6, 2009,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/06/clinton.kenya/index.html.
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II. LAW OF THE SEA AND PIRACY:
ISSUES OF DEFINITION AND JURISDICTION
Some enforcement constraints arise in connection with the scope
of the substantive provisions of the UNCLOS itself. If international
law regarding piracy is inadequate, one of the primary protective
safeguards against piratical acts would be severely limited with respect
to both the scope of protection as well as the extent to which
91
jurisdiction can be exercised. If an act of piracy does not fall within
the ambit of the UNCLOS, an institution or state that prosecutes
pirates at the international level would not have jurisdiction unless
the Convention’s provisions also conferred on it sufficient subject
92
matter jurisdiction. These issues call for an analysis of not only the
sufficiency and efficacy of existing enforcement institutional
mechanisms from a procedural standpoint, but also an analysis of the
adequacy of the substantive laws that are used to combat piracy.
Several commentators have undertaken studies on the normative
93
adequacy of piracy provisions under the UNCLOS. Even the United
Nations has recently recognized similar inadequacies, and to that
end, has sought to supplement the UNCLOS by passing a number of
94
legally binding resolutions.
A. Defining Piracy
To begin, when confronted with an act of violence at sea, a state
must ask: Where did the act take place? Questions of jurisdiction will
be resolved once it is determined whether the act took place in parts
95
of the sea under the sovereignty of the coastal state, or instead, in

91. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The New “Jamaica Discipline”: Problems with Piracy,
Maritime Terrorism and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127,
146 (1990) (estimating that “less than one in five recent incidents of maritime
violence would qualify as high seas piracy under [UNCLOS],” and arguing that
UNLCOS reduces the basis for international jurisdiction over piratical crimes).
92. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (explaining that modern international law on
piracy does not cover attacks occurring within the territorial sea of a coastal state,
thereby typically rendering the international community powerless to prosecute).
93. See, e.g., Menefee, supra note 91, at 141–48 (detailing alleged defects in
UNCLOS, including the lack of clarity over what constitutes an illegal act and the
requirement that a piratical act be committed for a private end).
94. See infra Part III (discussing how the United Nations has adopted resolutions
conferring maritime powers not granted in UNCLOS to member states in order to
allow them to conduct antipiracy operations in Somali waters and to facilitate the
prosecution of suspected pirates).
95. Under UNCLOS, areas under the sovereignty of the coastal state include:
Internal Waters and Ports (Arts. 8 and 11); Territorial Sea (Art. 2); and Archipelagic
Waters (Art. 49), including onboard vessels of the flag state (Art. 92). UNCLOS,
supra note 18. Under Article 105 of UNCLOS, any state can arrest and prosecute acts
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96

international waters.
If taking place in an area under the
sovereignty of a coastal state, the act would likely be a criminal
97
The UNCLOS
offense under the laws of the coastal state.
98
enumerates specific acts that constitute piracy.
The UNCLOS
definition of piracy, adopted from the definition provided in the
99
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, provides:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of
violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another
ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship
or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary
participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of
inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
100
subparagraph (a) or (b).

Some contemporary commentators understand this definition to
101
be a codification of the customary international law on piracy. If it
of piracy even if such acts are committed in international waters, regardless of
whether the vessels were carrying the state’s flag or not.
96. Under UNCLOS, areas under international waters include: High Seas (Art.
86) and Exclusive Economic Zones (Art. 58(2)). Id.
97. Rothwell, supra note 16.
98. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 101.
99. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, arts. 15–18, April 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
100. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 101 (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., Erik Barrios, Note, Casting a Wider Net: Addressing the Maritime Piracy
Problem in Southeast Asia, 28 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 149, 153 (2005) (explaining
that if UNCLOS is treated as a codification of customary international law on piracy,
all states, whether they are signatories or not, would be bound by the UNCLOS
definition). Other commentators, however, argue either that there is “no custom
regarding a modern definition of piracy” or that the UNCLOS definition is only a
partial codification of the customary law on piracy. John E. Noyes, Introduction to the
International Law of Piracy, 21 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105, 109 (1990) (quoting Barry Hart
Dubner, Piracy in Contemporary National and International Law, 21 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
139, 143 (1990). If one considers customary international law to be broader than
UNCLOS, then, some argue, customary international law may be applicable to
incidents involving insurgents or terrorists not otherwise part of the UNCLOS
definition. Id. The two regimes of international law can exist separately. In Military
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), the International
Court of Justice held that customary international law concerning the right of a state
to use force against another state exists separately from such rules as those contained
in the U.N. Charter, even where the two categories of law are largely identical.
Military, 1986 I.C.J. ¶¶ 172–82. This holding highlights the indefinite meaning of
piracy in customary international law, which seems so amorphous that different
commentators reach different conclusions as to “the outer limits of a rule of
customary international law proscribing piracy.” Noyes, supra note 101, at 110.
Professor Rubin, in his comprehensive study of piracy since Greek and Roman times,
argues that the concept of piracy reveals no consistent practice. ALFRED P. RUBIN,
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is, then even states that are not parties to the UNCLOS may be
102
bound, under appropriate conditions, by the same definition. But
does this mean that the definition is sufficient to meet contemporary
challenges?
The “core meaning” of this definition is that piracy involves
“individuals on one private ship [attacking] another ship on the high
103
seas, solely for private, commercial gain.”
In a world where nonstate organizations that commit piratical acts are becoming
increasingly assertive, as evidenced by the increase in pirate attacks
occurring in the Gulf of Aden and in the waters off the coasts of
104
Somalia and West Africa, several contemporary commentators resist
a definition of piracy that does not include reference to terrorist or
105
political activity.
It would be self-defeating, they argue, to restrict
the definition of piracy to commercially motivated acts when acts
meant to promote terror or political objectives can pose a similar
106
threat to safety at sea. The increase in political motives inextricably
linked to illegal activities at sea demonstrates that a distinction
between motives is no longer sustainable in a world where non-state
actors are either as powerful or more powerful than some states. In
the Niger Delta, for instance, the rebels justify their recourse to
107
Similarly, pirates in Somalia
piracy by citing political objectives.
have used their ransom money to advance their own extremist
political objectives. Recent United Nations reports indicate that

THE LAW OF PIRACY 1–2 (2d ed. 1988). A rule of customary international law requires
fairly consistent state practice with a sense of legal authority or opinio juris vel
necessitatis. Noyes, supra note 101, at 109–10.
102. See Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy
and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM J. INT’L L. 269, 272 n.12 (1988)
(explaining that customary international law recognizes absolute universal
jurisdiction over the crime of piracy and, as a result, the location where the piratical
act is committed is largely irrelevant).
103. See Noyes, supra note 101, at 109.
104. See Int’l Maritime Org., Piracy in the Waters off the Coast of Somalia,
http://www.imo.org/Facilitation/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1178 (last visited June 3,
2010) (reporting that the frequency of piratical attacks in East Africa has risen
astronomically, with new incidents reported almost daily in 2008).
105. See, e.g., Garmon, supra note 84, at 275 (advancing the position that in order
to effectively combat terrorism, it is necessary to include in the UNCLOS definition
of piracy piratical acts motivated by political objectives).
106. See Halberstam, supra note 102, at 289 (observing the similarities between
terrorists and pirates include that (1) they both threaten all states by attacking many
states indiscriminately and (2) generally no one state can be held responsible for
their acts).
107. See Ukoha Ukiwo, From “Pirates” to “Militants”: A Historical Perspective on Antistate and Anti-oil Company Mobilization Among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta, 106
AFR. AFF. 587, 603 (2007) (explaining that “violent mobilization was justified on the
grounds that previous appeals for understanding had failed to yield the desired
objectives of self-determination”).
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“[t]here are increasing reports of complicity by members of the
Somali region of ‘Puntland’ administration in piracy activities” and
that “[i]t is widely acknowledged that some of these [piracy] groups
now rival established Somali authorities in terms of their military
108
capabilities and resource bases.” Some legal scholars argue that the
“private ends” criterion should include acts committed by groups or
persons, such as rebel groups, “that rob or arrest a [vessel] for a
109
ransom as a fundraiser scheme to fund their political activities.” Yet
other scholars find support in customary international law that the
110
prohibition against piracy also covers political acts.
In support of
111
this contention, some scholars cite domestic case law. However, it is
unlikely that such domestic cases will override the clear letter of the
112
UNCLOS.
B. Terrorist and Political Acts in the Context of Piracy
Terrorist concerns have not escaped the attention of
113
114
commentators. If there are state-sponsors of terrorism, why would
108. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1846 (2008), ¶¶ 5, 7, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. S/2009/146 (Mar. 16, 2009).
109. See, e.g., H.E. José Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign Ships Against Piracy and
Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects, 18 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 363, 379 (2003)
(arguing that “grey areas . . . make it difficult to distinguish an act for ‘private ends’
from an act in pursuit of a politically-motivated one”).
110. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 102, at 289 (stating that although customary
international law does not have a clear definition of piracy, terrorist acts would most
likely be considered piracy under customary international law).
111. See, e.g., John Kavanagh, The Law of Contemporary Sea Piracy, 1999 AUSTL. INT’L
L.J. 127, 139–40 (looking to Australian case law to determine “who is a pirate”). The
Australian case R. v. Walton, (1827) N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas. 7 (Austrl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/NSWSupC/1827/7.html, is instructive on this
point. In Walton, sixty-six convicts seized control of a vessel but were careful not to
harm the seamen who became their captives. Id. The convicts expressed their
intention to return the brig and its cargo once they achieved their liberty. Id. When
they were captured, the convicts were nevertheless convicted of the offense of piracy.
That is why Viscount Sankey said in In re Piracy Jure Gentium, (1934) A.C. 586 (U.K.),
that “[w]hen it is sought to be contended, as it was in this case, that armed men
sailing the seas on board a vessel . . . could attack and kill everybody on board
another vessel . . . without committing the crime of piracy unless they stole
[something,] . . . their Lordships are almost tempted to say that a little common
sense is a valuable quality in the interpretation of international law.” Id. at 594.
112. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
113. See Jesus, supra note 109, at 363 (noting “a spiraling increase of piratical and
terrorist attacks against shipping and persons on board,” in addition to
“unprecedented maritime insecurity in modern times”).
114. For example, in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York on September 11, 2001, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1373
recognizing that the attacks had taken place with governmental support. S.C. Res.
1373, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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115

it be impossible to have state sponsors of piracy?
Current trends
116
indicate that piracy has turned increasingly violent and deadly. The
IMB reports, for instance, that “[i]n the first six months of 2008 . . .
11 vessels were fired upon . . . [a] total of 190 crew members were
taken hostage, six kidnapped, seven killed and another seven are
117
missing, presumed dead.” Additionally, reports of the IMO indicate
that, in many cases, pirates have taken hostage the crew of captured
ships and have even threatened to kill members of the crew,
118
depending on their nationality.
Recently, snipers from the U.S. military “fatally shot three pirates
holding an American cargo-ship captain hostage after seeing that one
119
of the pirates ‘[was leveling] an AK-47 at the captain’s back.’” The
pirates threatened to avenge their comrades’ deaths by killing U.S.
120
sailors they would take hostage in the future. Obviously, in such a
situation the pirates’ motives go beyond financial objectives, but to
deny that they are pirates because of their political, as opposed to
financial, objective seems absurd.
Nevertheless, shortly after
publicizing their threat, the Somali pirates carried it out by attacking
121
an American freighter with rockets.
One of the pirate
commanders, Abdi Garad, was reported to have said: “We intended
to destroy this American flagged ship and the crew on board but
122
unfortunately they narrowly escaped us.” In another case, members
of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) disguised themselves as
tourists in order to board the M/S Achille Lauro, whereupon the
group “threatened to blow up the cruise ship if Israel did not release
115. See Clyde H. Crockett, Toward a Revision of the International Law of Piracy, 26
DEPAUL L. REV. 78, 90 (1976) (arguing that it would be “unwise to foreclose forever
the possibility that a State, or those acting in behalf of a State, may come within the
ambit of piracy”).
116. For example, on May 31, 2009, the M/V Stolt Strength sustained damage from
the automatic gun and rocket propelled grenade fire of pirates. INT’L MARITIME
ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: ACTS REPORTED
DURING MAY 2009 (MSC.4/Circ.137) 5 (June 17, 2009).
117. ICC Commercial Crime Services, International Chamber of Commerce, IMB
Piracy Report Highlights Trouble in African Waters, July 10, 2008, http://www.icc-ccs.org
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157:imb-piracy-report-highlightstrouble-in-african-waters&catid=60:news&Itemid=51.
118. See, e.g., INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AGAINST SHIPS: ACTS REPORTED DURING DECEMBER 2009 (MSC.4/Circ.147) Annex 1 at
1–2 (Jan. 5, 2009) (reporting that in December alone, at least fifty-seven people were
taken hostage).
119. Hostage Captain Rescued; Navy Snipers Kill 3 Pirates, CNN.COM, Apr. 12, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/12/somalia.pirates/.
120. Pirates Vow to Kill U.S., French Sailors, CNN.COM, Apr. 13, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/13/somalia.pirates.revenge.
121. Mustafa Haji Abdinur, Pirates Take Revenge on U.S. Ship, NATIONAL POST, Apr.
15, 2009, available at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1498592.
122. Id.
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123

fifty Palestinian prisoners.”
Some argue that because of the PLF’s
political motivations fueled this attack, the group should not be
124
In a complex world where material gains are
considered pirates.
often intermingled with political objectives, such hairsplitting
distinctions may only deprive the international community of an
important tool in the suppression of piracy. Justice Story of the U.S.
Supreme Court made a great insight when, many years ago, he noted:
A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani generis. . . .
If he willfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without
any other object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it
is just as much a piratical aggression, in the sense of the law of
nations, and of the act of Congress, as if he did it solely and
exclusively for the sake of plunder, lucri causa[.] The law looks to it
as an act of hostility, and being committed by a vessel not
commissioned and engaged in lawful warfare, it treats it as the act
125
of a pirate, and of one who is emphatically hostis humani generis.

The International Law Commission (ILC) appears to support the
foregoing proposition. The ILC cited Mr. Matsuda, Rapporteur of
the Sub-Committee on the League of Nations Committee of Experts
for the Progressive Codification of International Law, who said that
“[i]t is better, in laying down a general principle, to be content with
the external character of the facts without entering too far into the
126
often delicate question of motives.”
The ILC also cited L.
Oppenheim who expressed a similar view:
In the regular case of piracy the pirate wants to make booty . . . .
But he remains a pirate, whether he does so or whether he kills the
crew and appropriates the ship, or sinks her. . . . [T]he cargo need
not be the object of his act of violence. . . . [I]t is likewise piracy if
he stops a vessel merely to kill a certain person on board, although
127
he may afterwards free vessel, crew, and cargo.

The ILC followed the Harvard Research Draft of the Harvard
128
Research Center, which had observed: “The draft convention

123. See Bahar, supra note 2, at 27.
124. See id. at 27 n.114 (elaborating that although it is not clear whether the initial
seizure took place in Egyptian territory or on the high seas, it is clear that the hostage
phase occurred on the high seas).
125. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844).
126. Summary Records of the 290th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n, 40 U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.290 (internal citations omitted).
127. Id.
128. In 1932, the Harvard Research in International Law Group created the Draft
Convention on Piracy. See Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 739 (1932). Article 7(1) of
this Draft Convention permitted “hot pursuit,” which allowed a state to pursue a
pirate vessel into the territorial seas of a foreign state if the pursuit began in its own
territorial waters or on the high seas. Id. at 744. Some countries followed this
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excludes from its definition of piracy all cases of wrongful attacks on
persons or property for political end . . . . [T]here seems no good
reason why jurisdiction over genuine cases of this type should not be
129
confined to the injured State.”
It is also important to note that
drafters of the UNCLOS explicitly failed to delete animus furandi
from their definition of piracy, because piracy “may be prompted by
feelings of hatred or revenge, and not merely by the desire for
130
gain.”
C. Territorial Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty
For the purposes of territorial jurisdiction, the definition of piracy
131
restricts acts of piracy to those committed on the high seas.
But
often times, pirates target ships in territorial waters that are home to
132
some of the most popular commercial shipping lanes. In fact, most
incidents of attacks on commercial vessels have occurred in territorial
133
134
waters within the jurisdiction of a coastal state. The 2008 annual
report of the IMO indicates that “[m]ost of the attacks worldwide
were reported to have occurred or to have been attempted in the
coastal States’ concerned territorial waters while the ships were at
135
anchor or berthed.”
The IMO has made the same observation in

Convention until the United Nations adopted the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, and UNCLOS. But under UNCLOS, a state may engage in hot pursuit only
when the pirate ship is within the territorial sea of the pursuing state. UNCLOS,
supra note 18, art. 111, ¶¶ 1–3. The right of hot pursuit terminates as soon as the
suspected pirate vessel enters the territorial waters of another state. Id.; see also Ethan
C. Stiles, Note, Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy, 27
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 299, 305–10 (2004) (arguing that the change from the
Harvard Convention to UNCLOS resulted from concern for a state’s sovereign right
to control its territorial water).
129. Summary Records, supra note 126.
130. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50.
131. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 101.
132. See Matthew C. Houghton, Comment, Walking the Plank: How United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1816, While Progressive, Fails to Provide a Comprehensive
Solution to Somali Piracy, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253, 255 (2009) (noting that
“Somali pirates target shipping lanes that feed the Suez Canal and the Gulf of
Aden”).
133. Barry Hart Dubner, Human Rights and Environmental Disaster—Two Problems
that Defy the “Norms” of the International Law of Sea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM.
7, 34 (1997); see also Jesus, supra note 109, at 383 (noting that, as reported by the IMB
and IMO, “two-thirds [of piracy incidents] consistently take place inside coastal
states’ territorial waters”).
134. UNCLOS, supra note 18, arts. 8, 2, 49; see Jesus, supra note 109, at 380
(advancing the position that the inapplicability of international piracy rules to
territorial waters is a major shortcoming of the current legal regime).
135. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST
SHIPS: ANNUAL REPORT—2008 (MSC.4/Circ.133) ¶ 5 (Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter
IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2008].
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136

each of the previous three years. Even still, it is unlikely that all of
the affected countries would allow the navies of other nations to
137
As long as international rules
operate in their territorial waters.
regarding piracy do not apply to territorial waters, responsibility to
combat acts that would otherwise qualify as piracy belongs solely to
the coastal state, even when such a state is unwilling or unable, for
political, financial, or other reasons, to suppress robbery against
138
vessels in its own sovereign waters.
By confining the scope of the definition of piracy to acts
committed in specific geographic areas, the UNCLOS assumes the
existence of a coastal sovereign state that is functional and capable of
defending the territorial waters off its coast. Somalia refutes this
assumption in the extreme, as contemporary piracy is rampant there
due to dysfunctional and failed government, a paucity of laws
139
regulating piracy, and an inadequate system for legal enforcement.
These issues were exemplified in June, 2007, when pirates hijacked a
140
Danish cargo ship, the M/V Danica White, off the Somali coast. In
response, an American warship pursued the pirates, but called the
141
chase off once the pirates reached the territorial waters of Somalia.
Because its only role was that of the pursuing state, the United States
had no power under international law to prosecute any of the
142
suspected pirates. The incongruity here is apparent as an act may
constitute piracy if it is committed on the high seas but will not be
covered by international rules concerning piracy if it is committed in
136. IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supra note 30, ¶ 5; IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2006,
supra note 5, ¶ 5; IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 5, ¶ 5.
137. See Ctr. for Int’l Law, N.Y. Law Sch., Avast! International Law and Piracy on the
High Seas, INT’L REV., Fall 2008, at 5. (observing that countries such as Indonesia have
limited the scope of Resolution 1816 so that it applies only to the unique situation in
Somalia).
138. Scholars have commented that the insistence on state sovereignty in
territorial waters is probably an obsolete notion due to today’s technology. See, e.g.,
Dubner, supra note 133, at 40 (“The three-mile cannon shot rule, the creation of the
exclusive economic zone, and the end of the cold war . . . have made the need for a
belt of territorial waters measured twelve miles from the baseline obsolete.”).
139. See Avast!, supra note 137, at 4–5 (observing that Somalia’s government is far
from recovered from a protracted civil war, which has allowed piracy to flourish).
140. Id. at 4.
141. See id. In 1991, a similar scenario unfolded with regard to the M/V Erria Inge,
an Australian-owned and Cyprus-registered ship. After commandeering the ship
from the port of Bombay, pirates later sold it for scrap in China. Kavanagh, supra
note 111, at 139. Although the evidence overwhelmingly suggested that the theft,
control, and ultimate sale of the vessel was organized from Singapore, under
international law regarding piracy, the Singaporean government did not have
jurisdiction to prosecute the pirates. Id. This was because the piratical acts originally
occurred in the territorial waters of another coastal state and piracy under the
UNCLOS covers only acts on the high seas. Id.
142. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 111.
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the internal or territorial waters of a coastal state. Indeed, this is still
the case even when the act is not considered piracy under a coastal
143
state’s domestic laws. In such circumstances, the offended state has
no jurisdiction to exercise power over the suspects unless the laws of
144
the coastal state expressly authorize such jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the “extradite or prosecute” clause of the 1988
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
145
Maritime Navigation (SUA) does not apply to piracy.
D. Hot Pursuit in Territorial Waters
In less extreme cases, states have varying levels of competence with
regard to the extent to which they control their territory and
territorial sea. The right of hot pursuit is especially relevant here.
The notion of hot pursuit, however, also does not provide a sufficient
146
solution. Hot pursuit is exclusively a coastal state right. According
to Article 27 (1)(b) of the UNCLOS, a coastal state may exercise
criminal jurisdiction over the crew of a foreign vessel (that is, flying
the flag of another state) “if the crime is of a kind to disturb the
147
peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea” —that
is, if the effects of criminal activity extend to the coastal state. Under
Article 27(5) of the UNCLOS:
[T]he coastal state may not take any steps on board a foreign ship
passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to
conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed
before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding
from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea
148
without entering internal waters.

Thus, even if acts that qualify as piratical were committed in that
portion of the sea, the coastal state may not exercise jurisdiction.
Moreover, Article 111 of the UNCLOS specifically relates to a
coastal state’s right of hot pursuit, providing:
143. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (explaining that, in the case of Somalia, the
government lacked the ability to effectively enforce piracy laws in its own waters).
144. See id. (arguing that “the current legal regime is not comprehensive with
respect to the enforcement of either international law or domestic criminal law
against those responsible for pirate attacks”).
145. Unless the states in question are both parties to SUA, the acts in question fall
within the definition of unlawful acts of Article 3, or the states are parties to a
bilateral extradition treaty. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 3, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 224–25
(1988) [hereinafter SUA].
146. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Foreign Naval Intervention in Cases of Piracy: Problems
and Strategies, 14 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 353, 360 (1999).
147. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 27, ¶ 1.
148. Id. art. 27, ¶ 5.
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[H]ot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the
competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to
believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that
State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or
one of its boats is within the internal waters, the archipelagic
waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing
State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the
149
contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted.

The ILC recognizes that the right of hot pursuit derives from the
regulations adopted by the Second Committee of The Hague
Conference, but that it differs from the 1930 regulations in some
150
respects.
This means, for example, that if pursuit of suspected
pirates begins in the territorial waters of Kenya or Yemen, it must be
terminated as soon as the pursuit enters the territorial waters of
Somalia, unless Somali authorities grant the pursuers explicit
permission to continue the pursuit.
As incidents of piracy have proliferated, so has the deployment of
navies to counter piracy. But this response has its limitations. Article
107 of the UNCLOS provides that only warships, military aircraft, or
other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as representing
government services authorized by the government may carry out a
151
seizure on account of piracy. This seems to indicate that seizures by
private ships would not be authorized under the purview of this
provision. In light of contemporary challenges, however, this seems
to be an overly constraining provision. In the wake of the American
M/V Maersk Alabama incident, there was praise for the way the crew
had acted in self-defense, and it was hoped that future crews would be
equipped to respond not just to executed attacks, but also to
152
suspected attacks in order to contain the problem of piracy.
Yet,
even an act in self-defense seems to fall outside the scope of this
153
The deficiencies of this provision illustrate an overly
provision.
state-centric conception. The commentary of the ILC on Article 45
of the Convention on the High Seas, a provision similar to Article 107
149. Id. art. 111, ¶ 1.
150. See ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, at 285 (stating that the commission’s
rules only differ from those of The Hague Conference in defining zones in which hot
pursuit may be undertaken and whether aircraft may participate in hot pursuit).
151. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 107.
152. See Pirates Foiled in a Second Attack on Maersk Alabama Cargo Ship, CNN.COM,
Nov. 19, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/11/18/maersk.alabama
.pirates/index.html?iref=allsearch (noting that the crew of the M/V Maersk Alabama
later used force to repel a subsequent pirate attack).
153. See Kavanagh, supra note 111, at 144 (noting that the International Law
Commission commentary indicates that acts of self defense by a merchant ship are
not covered under Article 107).
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of the UNCLOS, urges that “State action against ships suspected of
engaging in piracy should be exercised with great circumspection, so
154
as to avoid friction between States.” Hence, it is important that the
155
right to take action be confined to warships.
The commentary
adds:
Clearly this article does not apply in the case of a merchant ship
which has repulsed an attack by a pirate ship and, in exercising its
right of self-defense, overpowers the pirate ship and subsequently
hands it over to a warship or to the authorities of a coastal State.
156
This is not a “seizure” within the meaning of this article.

What happens when a suspected pirate vessel being pursued by a
foreign government’s warship manages to escape into the territorial
waters of a coastal state that is unwilling to continue pursuing the
pirate vessel? The UNCLOS expressly provides that “[t]he right of
hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial
157
sea of its own State or of a third State.” This provision defers to the
sovereignty of other states, but it also assumes that the coastal state of
the ship pursued or the third state is willing and able to capture and
prosecute the suspected pirates. As contemporary piratical acts
amply demonstrate, deference to other states’ sovereignty largely
ignores the reality that some states are either unwilling or unable to
prosecute suspected pirates. The UNCLOS places limitations on
daring action. Under Article 110 of the UNCLOS, a warship must
first send an officer-led party to board a suspected pirate ship to verify
158
any suspicions.
The warship cannot simply open fire; rather, any
159
inspection has to be carried out “with all possible consideration.”
The provision’s language sounds “rather tentative,” as one
160
commentator has observed.
The UNCLOS provides for a restrictive form of innocent passage
through the territorial sea and through the straits of the coastal
states. With respect to territorial sea, the treaty provides for innocent
passage of warships, as long as the ship complies with state laws and
regulations for passage; otherwise, it may be ordered to leave the
161
territorial sea.
With respect to straits, the treaty requires ships,
including warships, to proceed through straits without delay and to
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, at 283.
Id.
Id.
UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 111, ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Reynolds, supra note 25.
UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 30.
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“refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, [or]
162
territorial integrity . . . of the States.” At least one commentator has
argued that this means that a foreign warship has no chance of
undertaking antipiracy activities in a state’s coastal waters under the
UNCLOS without the permission of the coastal state, unless it wishes
163
to risk the possibility of sanctions. Any intervention in these areas
would depend upon the existence of separate bilateral or multilateral
164
agreements.
All state parties to the UNCLOS have a duty to cooperate to the
“fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or
165
in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”
Again
though, this obligation ceases as soon as pirates cross into the
territorial or internal waters of a coastal state. According to the
commentary of the ILC on a similarly worded definition for piracy in
Article 39 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, “where
the attack takes place within the territory of a State, including its
territorial sea, the general rule should be applied that it is a matter
for the State affected to take the necessary measures for the
166
repression of the acts committed within its territory.”
However,
coastal states have no international obligation to enact domestic laws
aimed at combating acts considered to be piracy under international
law.
E. Deficiencies in the Definition of Piracy
The SUA attempts to address forms of maritime violence that are
not included in the UNCLOS definition. The SUA extended the
definition of piracy to include attacks within territorial waters, but it
did not extend the scope of universal jurisdiction to cover such
167
attacks. Not only does SUA apply to offenses committed in almost
168
all areas of the oceans, including territorial waters, it also requires
state parties to either prosecute or extradite perpetrators of maritime
169
violence.
The SUA leaves unanswered, though, the question of
what happens in situations where the coastal state is unwilling or
unable to prosecute suspected pirates or extradite them to a third
162. Id. art. 39, ¶ 1.
163. See Menefee, supra note 146, at 360 (arguing that the UNCLOS may prevent
foreign ships from assisting in antipiracy efforts).
164. Id.
165. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 100.
166. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, art. 39.
167. SUA, supra note 145, art. 4.
168. Id. arts. 4, 6.
169. Id. art. 10, ¶1.
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state. Whether extradition or prosecution takes place remains a
170
In addition,
matter exclusively within the discretion of the state.
the SUA requires that perpetrators or victims be nationals of a state
171
172
party to the convention. This effectively undercuts the jus cogens
and erga omnes character of the crime of piracy, which confers
universal jurisdiction to prosecute the crime. Furthermore, the
obligations under the SUA attach only to states that are parties to the
173
treaty.
It has also been noted that the definition of piracy is a bit
ambiguous to the extent that it proscribes only “illegal” acts of
174
violence.
As John Noyes points out, this ambiguity could be
interpreted to mean that some acts of violence are legal even when
175
carried out in the same context.
The term “illegal” could, for
example, contemplate the concept of “legal” violence by insurgents.
Debate continues over whether acts of violence committed within a
country’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but beyond its
territorial waters, qualify as acts of piracy since the definition only
176
refers to acts committed on the high seas. The concept accepted by
177
the ILC is narrower in scope.
Under international law, piracy is
limited to the high seas, which, as defined under the UNCLOS,
178
excludes economic zones and archipelagic waters. Yet, no country
has jurisdiction over the high seas—jurisdiction which Article 86 of
the UNCLOS defines as “all parts of the sea that are not included in
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea, or in the internal
179
waters of a State . . . .”
Article 86 substantially reduces states’
jurisdiction over piracy, because less than one in five incidents of
maritime violence qualify as high-seas piracy under the UNCLOS
180
standards.
Although Article 58 of the UNCLOS provides that the
170. See Garmon, supra note 84, at 273 (noting that while a state is obligated to
either prosecute or extradite any detained suspect, there are no regulations
governing when a state must take which action).
171. SUA, supra note 145, art. 6.
172. See Garmon, supra note 84, at 273 (noting that SUA essentially prevents piracy
from being a jus cogens offense because if neither the coastal state nor the
apprehending state establishes jurisdiction, a third-party country may not intervene).
173. SUA, supra note 145, art. 6.
174. See Noyes, supra note 101, at 106–07 (discussing how certain definitions from
treaties relating to the high seas contain information that is too vague to create
bright-line rules governing piracy).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 108.
177. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50 (stating that acts of piracy are limited to
waters that are outside the jurisdiction of states).
178. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 86.
179. Id.
180. Menefee, supra note 91, at 146.
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portion of the treaty that covers piracy also applies to the EEZ insofar
as those articles are not incompatible with the rights of coastal states,
that inclusion does not ameliorate the situation where a coastal state
181
is incapable of policing or enforcing these delegated rights.
Interestingly, the ILC took a different approach with respect to
piracy in “unoccupied territory,” and stated that “in considering as
‘piracy’ acts committed in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State
. . . the Commission did not wish to exclude acts committed . . .
within a larger unoccupied territory, since it wished to prevent such
acts committed on ownerless territories from escaping all penal
182
jurisdiction.”
It is difficult to imagine how different such
“ownerless” territories are from the “high seas,” where state authority
is virtually non-existent. As “ownerless” territories present the same
problem as the “high seas,” it would be reasonable for those
territories to fall within the purview of Article 101 of the UNCLOS.
III. UNITED NATIONS: THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S LEGAL RESPONSES TO
PIRACY AND ITS FAILED EFFORTS
The United Nations is empowered to trump claims of sovereignty
183
when it acts in the interest of international peace and security.
Recourse to Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, which has permitted the
adoption of several resolutions in circumvention of Article 111(3) of
the UNCLOS, has not been sufficient to provide for a prosecutorial
184
regime.
In light of this loophole in the UNCLOS, the “United
Nations Security Council responded proactively throughout 2008, [to
the recent rise in piracy], by adopting Resolutions that for the first
time conferred upon maritime powers the capacity to enter Somali
waters to conduct anti-piracy operations and to facilitate the
185
prosecution of suspected pirates.”
The situation in Somalia
probably did not constitute a threat to international peace and
186
security. Still, most of the recent U.N. Security Council Resolutions

181. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 58.
182. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, at 282 (emphasis added).
183. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (providing that the United Nations is not to
intervene in the matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state, but that this principle “shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII”).
184. See id. art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail.”).
185. Rothwell, supra note 16.
186. But see Al Qaeda Fighters Move into Horn of Africa, Officials Say, CNN.COM, June
12, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/12/alqaeda.africa/index.html
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have been created under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, implying
187
that they are legally binding on all states.
In Resolution 1872, passed in 2009, the U.N. Security Council
recognized that instability in Somalia fostered the problem of piracy
and that combating piracy and its underlying causes will require a
188
comprehensive response. If the situation in Somalia was left alone,
the Council recognized, it would continue to pose a threat to
189
international peace and security in the region. The Council has in
the past recognized “the Transitional Federal Government’s (TFG)
inability to interdict, or upon interdiction to prosecute pirates or to
190
patrol and secure the waters off the coast of Somalia . . . .”
In
191
response to the lacuna in the UNCLOS, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 1816, which authorizes states that cooperate with
the Somali TFG to “enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the
192
purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at seas.”
Although the intervention of the Council through its various
resolutions helped to fill some gaps in the UNCLOS by extending
enforcement jurisdiction, jurisdictional loopholes remain, and they
are compounded by the lack of political will of some members of the
193
international community to engage in law enforcement.
One
critical shortcoming of the Council’s responses is that they are
limited in scope because they deal solely with the situation in
Somalia. They do not extend to pirate attacks that may take place off
194
adjacent coasts or in other parts of the world.
From a normative
standpoint, the U.N. Resolutions do not attempt to establish
customary international because they restrict their application to only
195
the particular situation in Somalia.

(noting that officials believe that al-Qaeda is setting up headquarters in Somalia and
Yemen).
187. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter provides that “Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.”
U.N. Charter art. 25. Some of the Resolutions taken under Chapter Seven include:
Resolution 1872 and Resolution 1851. See S.C. Res. 1872, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1872
(May 26, 2009); S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1.
188. S.C. Res. 1872, supra note 187.
189. Id.
190. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
191. See supra Part II (observing, among other things, that the definition of piracy
excludes criminal acts occurring in the territorial sea of a coastal state, which would
otherwise qualify as acts of piracy).
192. S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
193. Rothwell, supra note 16.
194. Id. (noting, for example, that the Resolutions do not address pirate attacks
off the coast of nearby Kenya).
195. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1 (providing that “this resolution shall not
be considered as establishing customary international law”).
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As subsequent events since the passage of these Resolutions have
shown, the global piracy problem has only been exacerbated. Apart
from Somalia, other areas experiencing more frequent acts of piracy
include the Gulf of Guinea near Nigeria and Niger, the Malacca
Strait between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the Indian subcontinent
between India and Sri Lanka. Under these circumstances, the United
Nations should move toward a more permanent and resolute piracy
enforcement mechanism.
As piracy activities off the Somali coast escalated, the U.N. Security
Council was prompted to adopt Resolution 1838 in September, 2008.
The Resolution called upon U.N. member states with “naval vessels
and military aircraft operat[ing] on the high seas and airspace off the
coast of Somalia to use . . . the necessary means, in conformity with
196
international law . . . for the repression of acts of piracy.”
One
month later, the Council renewed Resolution 1816 with the adoption
of Resolution 1846, an action that extended the international
197
community’s mandate for an additional twelve months.
The
Resolution permitted operations in Somali waters and allowed the
international community to operate on land where pirates could
198
potentially plan or begin to undertake acts of piracy.
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND PIRACY
To stem the rising tide of piratical activities, which have so far
defied international efforts, it is necessary to assure would-be pirates
that they cannot perennially act with impunity. To this end, one
199
proposal has been to create an ad hoc tribunal to deal with pirates.
Such an initiative would resolve the particular difficulties
encountered in law enforcement in Somalia and would provide the
international community with a better option than failing to
200
prosecute suspected pirates.
Because it is acknowledged that this
would only be a temporary solution, others have proposed a
permanent International Piracy Tribunal, modeled after the
201
International Criminal Court (ICC), with special piracy jurisdiction.
Although the ICC provides a tested example with which the

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008).
S.C. Res. 1846, Preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008).
S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1.
Rothwell, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
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international community could work, such a new tribunal “would
202
require detailed legal and political consideration.”
One commentator has suggested that “[w]ith the United Nations
Security Council recognising the threat to international peace and
security posed by piracy and sea robbery, and being prepared to
respond to the challenges by utilising its Chapter VII powers, it
becomes a short step for the Council to establish an ad hoc
203
‘International Piracy Tribunal.’” However, the United Nations has
struggled to keep even its current tribunals operational and has at
times resorted to hybrid tribunals—those with a mixture of national
and international jurisdiction. Indeed, this is one reason why the
204
United Nations supported the creation of the ICC.
With those
lessons in mind, the United Nations may be very reluctant to establish
another tribunal.
Over the years, states have prevented the adoption and
205
enforcement of a coherent and effective regulation of relevant laws.
Until such regulation is established, there can only be ad hoc
206
Because piratical acts
solutions to the problem of piracy.
committed inside the jurisdictional sovereignty of the coastal state are
regarded as acts of robbery, and not piracy, coastal states are not
required, and have no incentive, to pursue international cooperation
207
in combating such acts.
While this system certainly reflects that
state sovereignty is highly valued, the international community
rejected the idea that state sovereignty is absolute when it adopted a
series of international human rights agreements permitting
intervention when a country’s government commits atrocities against
208
its own citizens.
It is inconceivable that piracy, a crime regarded as one that is
committed against the human race, should not be suppressed and
prosecuted at the international level as effectively as other
internationally cognizable offenses. Not only does the UNCLOS fail
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Tom Dannenbaum, Crime Beyond Punishment, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L LAW &
POL’Y 189 (2009).
205. See Jesus, supra note 109, at 367–68 (noting that piracy is widely recognized as
an international problem, but that individual states have not been receptive to
international solutions).
206. Id. at 368.
207. Id. at 372.
208. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”).
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to impose any obligation on its signatory state parties to prosecute
and punish pirates, it also leaves discretion to each state to decide
whether or not the state will exercise jurisdiction to try suspected
pirates and to what extent it will punish those convicted of the
209
crime.
But this jurisdiction may or may not be exercised by the
state in question. This permissive regime is a lacuna in international
law that exists in the wake of what are becoming increasingly violent
210
seas.
Piracy demands both universal jurisdiction as well as
international jurisdiction.
A. Universal Jurisdiction and International Jurisdiction
The prospect of creating a permanent Piracy Tribunal is unlikely
given the resource constraints faced by the United Nations and the
length of time it takes to negotiate international agreements. Some
211
propose, instead, an expansion of the jurisdiction of the ICC. This
accommodation, however, would create logistical issues.
For
example, the Statute of the ICC would have to be amended to
include the specific crime of piracy. Considering how long it took to
conclude the Rome Statute of the ICC, and because important actors
212
like the United States are still on the sidelines in that regard, this
would, perhaps, not be a viable solution.
The establishment of a special international tribunal has been
criticized on the ground that it leaves the crime of piracy under the
domain of traditional universal jurisdiction, which would permit any
state to prosecute suspected pirates, regardless of their nationality, as
long as they are found in the territory of the prosecuting state. The
seriousness of international piracy has been recognized since ancient
times, hence the designation of pirates as hostis humani generis—a
213
common enemy or enemy of all humankind. For the most part, the
enforcement of international law regarding piracy has historically

209. Jesus, supra note 109, at 374–75.
210. The IMO publishes yearly reports detailing the total numbers of violent acts
committed by pirates. See, e.g., IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 135, ¶ 6
(noting that in 2008, crews were violently attacked by “groups of five to ten people
carrying knives or guns” and that 6 crew members were killed, 42 were injured, 774
were kidnapped or held hostage, and 38 are still missing).
211. See, e.g., Bahar, supra note 2, at 26 (suggesting that piracy be added to the
Rome Statute of the ICC).
212. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts:
The Forgotten Precedent of Slave-Trade Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39 (2009) (describing
the history and constitutionality of the American participation (or lack thereof) in
international courts like the ICC).
213. See Erik Barrios, supra note 101, at 149, 152 (recognizing that “international
law treats piracy as a universal crime” because it “can inflict harm upon all states”).
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214

been left to municipal courts.
A pirate’s actions have always been
considered as so contrary to fundamental norms that they are
universally proscribed, and thus the pirate is subject to punishment
215
by all courts. In fact, in United States v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme
Court—describing piracy as “robbery, when committed upon the
sea”—acknowledged that piracy is “an offence against the universal
216
law of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race.”
Even though a few states are willing “to try pirates whose nationality,
vessel and victims are totally unconnected to [that state],” with the
volume and frequency of piracy cases on the rise, the current
217
jurisdictional laws have proven insufficient. Contemporary piracy is
a completely different threat than traditional piracy envisioned under
the UNCLOS. An effective response requires more than ad hoc or
piecemeal efforts such as U.N. Security Council resolutions or
impromptu tribunals, which are only tools used to curtail the
jurisdictional sovereignty of states.
Moreover, universal jurisdiction tends to increase interstate
tensions, and extending the definition of piracy to include acts
218
motivated by political ends would only exasperate such tensions.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has had to settle cases where
214. Noyes, supra note 101, at 105.
215. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
216. Id. at 161–62. In the S.S. Lotus case, heard by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in 1927, John Bassett Moore stated, “[A]s the scene of the
pirate’s operations is the high seas, which is not the right or duty of any nation to
police, he is denied the protection of the flag which he may carry, and is treated as
an outlaw, as the enemy of mankind—hostis humani generis—whom any nation may in
the interest of all capture and punish.” The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J
(ser. A) No. 10., at 65, 70 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also Harmony v. United States,
43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844) (recognizing that piracy is a universal crime);
United States v. Chapels, 25 F. Cas. 399, 403 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) (finding that piracy is
a universal crime punishable by all nations); United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653,
655, 658 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (finding that the defendant was not guilty of piracy for
acts committed against the Portuguese Triumph of Mars, but acknowledging that
piracy is a felony under the laws of the United States).
217. Noyes, supra note 101, at 115.
218. For example, Henry Kissinger argues that universal jurisdiction can be
employed to “settle political scores.” Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal
Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 86, 88 (2001). He also argues that such jurisdiction is
likely to “subject the accused to the criminal procedures of the magistrate’s country,
with a legal system that may be unfamiliar to the defendant and that would force the
defendant to bring evidence and witnesses from long distances.” Id. at 90. Diane
Orentlicher argues that when “a court exercises universal jurisdiction . . . it judges
conduct that took place within another country in light of law that was developed
through processes that transcend both states’ lawmaking institutions.” Diane F.
Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92
GEO. L.J. 1057, 1063 (2004). But Kenneth Roth thinks that this “fear . . . is
overblown,” and points out that “[g]overnments regularly deny extradition to courts
that are unable to ensure high standards of due process.” Kenneth Roth, The Case for
Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 150, 153 (2001).
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Belgium tried to exercise such jurisdiction regardless of the
219
underlying merits of the case. In recent times, Belgium and other
nations have also been discredited for engaging in selective
220
prosecution.
Universal jurisdiction leaves the question of “who to
prosecute” solely to the discretion of each state, whereas
international jurisdiction commits the international community as a
whole to act in a concerted way to combat piracy.
Some countries have been reluctant to invoke universal jurisdiction
to prosecute suspected pirates. However, a few European countries
that have expressed doubts about prosecuting Somali pirates have
been at the forefront of exercising universal jurisdiction through
other means. For example, “France, one of the more active nations
in the piracy campaign, regularly resorts to repatriation of pirates to
221
Somalia.”
International law works best when nations cooperate to resolve a
common problem that no single country is willing or able to engage
unilaterally, except at a great cost. Pirates cannot be allowed to
succeed, as there is simply too much at stake.
One major
shortcoming in the efforts to thwart piracy has been the lack of an
established international criminal tribunal that can administer
international criminal justice against suspected pirates.
This
deficiency has been exposed by the gravity and intractability of
222
contemporary piracy.
Without much discussion of pros and cons,
some commentators have suggested that “the time is now ripe to
consider the creation of a specialist international criminal tribunal to
223
deal with pirates.”
The benefit of “[s]uch a Tribunal [is that it]
would be able to prosecute individuals responsible for acts of piracy
219. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002
I.C.J. 3, 9 (14 Feb.) (discussing a Belgian law that purports to grant Belgian courts
universal jurisdiction where there are grave breaches of international law).
220. For example, Belgium and Spain have had to limit the scope of their
universal jurisdiction laws in order to avoid prosecuting former officials of the Bush
administration, an action that would have likely caused serious political tensions
between the United States and the two nations. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Spanish
Court Weighs Inquiry on Torture for 6 Bush-Era Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, at A6
(reporting that a Spanish court had “taken the first steps toward opening a criminal
investigation into allegations that six former high-level Bush administration officials
violated international law by providing the legal framework to justify the torture of
prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,” but also noting that “some American experts
said that even if warrants were issued their significance could be more symbolic than
practical, and that it was a near certainty that the warrants would not lead to arrests if
the officials did not leave the United States”).
221. Kontorovich, supra note 14.
222. See generally Rothwell, supra note 16 (discussing the recent upsurge in piracy
and the need for “a more comprehensive legal regime dealing with threats to
maritime security”).
223. Id.
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under the UNCLOS or crimes against international shipping as
224
envisaged under the SUA Convention.”
Without a doubt, there are risks that come with having multiple
tribunals; a primary concern is the possibility that inconsistent
jurisprudence will be created. From its inception, some have argued
against the existence of the ITLOS and its jurisdiction because the
ICJ and its predecessor—the Permanent Court of International
Justice—had already produced jurisprudence relating to disputes
225
concerning the law of the sea. They argued further that the ITLOS,
at best, amounts to a duplication of previous efforts and, at worst,
risks the creation of inconsistent jurisprudence. Still, the advantages
of the ITLOS can be succinctly summed up as follows:
New economic and scientific uses of the seas are also on the
increase, raising new legal questions which the Tribunal is wellplaced to answer with its expertise and state-of-the-art facilities.
Use of the Tribunal by States, international organizations or private
entities for contentious or advisory proceedings can only serve to
enhance the harmonized implementation of the Convention . . .
226
and help reinforce coherence in international law.

It seems that piracy is so intrinsically linked to the regime of the
Law of the Sea that it would be a natural step to designate
enforcement jurisdiction to the ITLOS. Determining whether such a
step would be appropriate, however, requires an examination of the
competency of the ITLOS.
B. The ITLOS Under Consideration
To begin, the UNCLOS does not authorize the ITLOS to hear
piracy cases brought against individuals, hence it provides no
personal jurisdiction.
Whereas any of the signatories to the
International Covenant on the Law of the Sea can bring a case to the
227
ITLOS, its jurisdiction is limited to the provisions of the treaty. The
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 6 (25 July)
(concerning dispute over Iceland’s jurisdictional waters); Fisheries Jurisdiction
(F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (25 July) (same).
226. Rüdiger Wolfrum, President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Statement of Acceptance of the ‘Award for Meritorious Contribution Towards the
Development, Interpretation and Implementation of International Maritime Law,’
presented to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, on the occasion of
the 2008 Graduation Ceremony of the IMO (May 3, 2008), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “Statements of the President” hyperlink
under “News”; then follow “Statements of President Wolfrum 2005–2008” hyperlink).
227. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 292 (“The court or tribunal shall deal
without delay with the application for release and shall deal only with the question of
release . . . .”).
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ITLOS is part of the UNCLOS compulsory third-party dispute
228
resolution mechanism. Arguably, states might invoke the provisions
of the UNCLOS on compulsory settlement of disputes in order to
bring interstate disputes over the interpretation of the UNCLOS
229
provisions on piracy to a tribunal. The chances of that happening,
though, are low, because states are often reluctant to bring their
230
citizens’ cases before international tribunals.
The UNCLOS does
not explicitly compel or authorize a particular tribunal to hear piracy
231
cases brought against individuals. Article 105 provides:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of
any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or
aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest
the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the
State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties
to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with
regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of
232
third parties acting in good faith.

Under the UNCLOS, all dispute-settlement procedures are open
233
In addition, the UNCLOS provides only
only to state parties.
234
limited possibilities for individual access to the ITLOS. So far, the
Tribunal only entertains cases in which individuals’ cases are
espoused by the flag state. In the M/V Saiga (No.2) Case (Saint Vincent
235
v. Guinea), the ITLOS held that it is the obligation of the flag state
to espouse claims of the people on a vessel even if they have different
236
nationalities because the vessel must be viewed as a “unit.”
The
ITLOS stated:
228. Id. arts. 286–87.
229. Noyes, supra note 101, at 113.
230. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liech.v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J 4 (6 Apr.). In the
Nottebohm case, Guatemala opposed Liechtenstein’s claim to espouse Nottebohm’s
complaint against Guatemala on the basis that he was a naturalized citizen of
Liechtenstein. Id. at 12–13. In fact, Nottebohm had never lived in Liechtenstein but
had instead lived in Guatemala for thirty-four years. Id. at 25. The case illustrates the
difficulties involved with relying on diplomatic protection in proceedings before
international tribunals that do not allow individual access. In an even more
pertinent example, Canada refused to espouse the case of a corporation registered in
Canada even though the ICJ ruled that it was Canada—and not Belgium—that had
the right to bring the case against Spain. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co.,
Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1964 I.C.J. 6, 14, 62, 83 (24 July).
231. See John E. Noyes, Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication and the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4 CONN. J. INT’L L. 675, 684 (1989) (noting
that the UNCLOS leaves some control of the adjudication process to states by
providing them “with four options for formal adjudication”).
232. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 105 (emphasis added).
233. Id. art. 291.
234. UNCLOS, supra note 18, at Annex VI, art. 20.
235. 120 I.L.R. 143 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999).
236. Id. ¶ 106.
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The provisions . . . indicate that the Convention considers a ship as
a unit, as regards the obligations of the flag State with respect to
the ship and the right of a flag State to seek reparation for loss or
damage caused to the ship by acts of other States and to institute
proceedings under article 292 of the Convention. Thus the ship,
every thing on it, and every person involved or interested in its
operations are treated as an entity linked to the flag State. The
237
nationalities of these persons are not relevant.

The ITLOS can play an important role in countering international
piracy. The current president of the ITLOS, José Luis Jesus, has
stated that the Tribunal is “ready to judge each piracy case that states
238
want it to deal with.” With respect to the powers of the ITLOS, the
president has said the Tribunal, acting as a full court,
may give an advisory opinion . . . as provided for in article 138 of
the Rules. This article further indicates that the request for an
advisory opinion is to be transmitted to the Tribunal by “whatever
body” is authorized under such an agreement to do so. As the
international community faces new challenges in ocean activities,
such as piracy and armed robbery, advisory proceedings before the Tribunal
on legal questions concerning the application and interpretation of
239
provisions of the Convention may prove to be a useful tool to States.

It may not be necessary to look any further than to the UNCLOS
240
and to the Statute of the ITLOS for such a tool. Because flag states
rarely demonstrate interest in prosecuting pirates, the following
question arises: Can a person on a ship with a nationality other than
that of the flag state have his nation of origin bring his case before
the Tribunal? Because issues of conflict of jurisdiction can arise, the
U.N. Security Council called “upon all States . . . of victims and
perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery . . . to cooperate in

237. Id.
238. UN Sea Court Ready to Judge Piracy Cases: Report, OTTAWA CITZEN, Apr. 22, 2009,
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/story_print.html?id=1523227&sponsor=.
239. H.E. José Luis Jesus, Statement by President of the International Tribunal For
the Law of the Sea On Agenda Item 70(a) at the Plenary of the Sixty-Third Session of
the United Nations General Assembly, ¶ 9 (Dec. 5, 2008) (emphasis added), available
at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “News” hyperlink to “Statements of
the President” hyperlink).
240. Under the UNCLOS, the ITLOS has “jurisdiction over any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement related
to the purposes of [UNCLOS], which is submitted to it in accordance with the
agreement.” UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 288, ¶ 2. Under the Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Annex VI of the UNCLOS), the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal includes all matters specifically provided for in any
agreement, other than the Convention, which confers jurisdiction upon the
Tribunal. Id., annex VI, art. 21.
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determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and prosecution of
241
persons responsible for acts of piracy.”
Just as the United Nations refers certain cases to the ICC, the
United Nations should refer cases to the ITLOS once that Tribunal is
determined to be an appropriate body for enforcement purposes.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF PIRACY PROVISIONS: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL
International strategies to enforce piracy laws must always remain
complementary to national strategies. This must also be the case with
respect to international human rights laws and international criminal
242
laws. To that end, it is important that states develop and strengthen
national approaches to combating piracy.
With respect to national efforts, much remains to be done to
ensure that normative and enforcement regimes are both
comprehensive and effective. Piracy law at the national level is
different from international piracy law in several respects. In cases
involving municipal crimes relating to piracy, jurisdiction is reserved
to the nation state. The jurisdiction of a state over acts of piracy is
based upon nationality or territoriality, and coastal states have the
sole jurisdiction to prosecute and punish acts of piracy committed
243
within their internal waters, territorial sea, and on their flag ships.
There must be a genuine link between the state and the ship, or
between the state and the waters on which an offense takes place.
The ability of a flag state to apply and enforce its own laws with
respect to piracy and sea robbery taking place in the waters of
another state depends on whether the pirate ship or the pirates have
the nationality of that state, or the degree to which the national law
of the enforcing state makes piracy a universal crime that is subject to
244
arrest and prosecution throughout the world.
245
In the S.S. Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice held that “vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority

241. S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 197.
242. See, e.g., Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court, art. 17(1)(a) ,
July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (providing that a case is inadmissible before the
International Criminal Court if it “is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution”).
243. Rothwell, supra note 16.
244. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Coalition Is the
Strategy, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 243, 268 (2009) (noting that many states’ criminal law
does not extend beyond the boundaries of the territorial sea and that it is unlikely
that such nations will be able to prosecute pirates).
245. (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
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246

except that of the State whose flag they fly.”
Article 92 of the
247
UNCLOS codifies this principle, but excepts cases where the vessel
is without nationality or where the vessel is engaged in piracy, slavery,
248
or unauthorized broadcasting.
The practice of using open
registries complicates matters.
Many African states use open
registries because they have limited resources available to them to
register ships. The problem is that open registries create a loophole
that protects pirates by enabling vessels without nationality and
vessels flying under the flag of a state without effective enforcement
249
jurisdiction to become “floating sanctuaries from authorities.”
If
flag states are incapable of effectively exercising control over the
ships they have registered, how can they be expected to enforce
piracy laws at all? Yet, there is no requirement for a genuine link to
the flag state. In other words, there is no requirement that the flag
state be capable of fulfilling its obligations pertaining to the status of
250
a flag state.
In piracy cases, and in cases involving the ineffective
enforcement regimes of flag states, universal jurisdiction could be
invoked, but such jurisdiction can only provide a remedy but cannot
provide a means to prevent piracy in the first instance.
Several countries have enacted their own domestic legal regimes to
deal with acts analogous to piracy that occur in their own territorial
waters. For example, the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to
251
define and punish piracy.
Pursuant to this constitutional
empowerment, the U.S. Congress has authorized the prosecution and
punishment of any person who, “on the high seas, commits the crime
of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought
246. Id. at 25.
247. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 92.
248. Id. art. 110.
249. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“Vessels without nationality are international pariahs. . . . Moreover, flagless vessels
are frequently not subject to the laws of a flag-State. As such they represent ‘floating
sanctuaries from authority’ and constitute a potential threat to the order and stability
of navigation on the high seas.” (citations omitted)); see George D. Gabel, Jr.,
Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an International Solution to Modern-Day
Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1439–40 (2007) (explaining that “[r]egistration in flagsof-convenience states is easy and may be completed often without inspection of the
vessel” and that many countries were motivated to open registries mainly so that they
could partake in the cash flow generated by the registration of ships, but that the
loosening of standards provided “fertile ground for growth in piratical acts”).
250. In M/V Saiga (No.2) Case (Saint Vincent v. Guinea), the ITLOS found that there
was nothing in UNCLOS that entitled other states to reject a vessel’s nationality on
the ground that the flag state was incapable of exercising proper jurisdiction. 120
I.L.R. 143, ¶¶ 82–86 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999).
251. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.10 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against
the Law of Nations.”).
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252

into or found in the United States.”
Moreover, the U.S. Congress
passed the Hostage Taking Act, which provides that whoever seizes an
American national abroad in order to obtain a ransom for the release
of that national “shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of
years or for life, and if the death of any person results, shall be
253
punished by death or life imprisonment.”
Not all countries have specific laws or provisions in their penal
codes that deal with piracy. In fact, some countries do not define
254
piracy in their laws, nor do they criminalize acts of piracy on the
255
high seas or in their own Exclusive Economic Zones, even if they
wish to allow universal jurisdiction. Countries that do have piracy
provisions in their laws define the crime differently depending on
their needs. For example, until recently, the Japanese piracy law did
not allow Japanese defense forces to operate beyond the shores of
Japan, which meant that pirates could target vessels flying under the
Japanese flag outside of Japanese waters without fear that they would
256
be captured by Japanese forces.
As a consequence of its domestic
law, Japan was unable to contribute to an international effort to
capture pirates beyond its shores.
The lack of uniformity in the definition of piracy throughout the
257
world, in conjunction with the complete absence of any definition
of piracy in some countries, will continue to impede efforts to reduce

252. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 960–67 (2006) (pertaining to
foreign relations matters involving piracy); 33 U.S.C. §§ 381–87 (2006) (regarding
regulations for suppression of piracy).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006). Some commentators have noted that, even though
U.S. domestic law is in place to prosecute piracy, there is a possibility that a due
process constitutional challenge may render enforcement of the piracy law
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 101, at 117 (arguing that 18 U.S.C. §
1651 might violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution because the law may not afford fair notice about wrongful
conduct, and asserting that § 1651’s reference to the “law of nations”—which is not
sufficiently specific—might run afoul of the constitutional requirement that the law
be clear on its face).
254. William P. Willig, Comment, The Santa Maria Incident: A Grey Zone Between
Unrecognized Insurgency on the High Seas and Piracy Jure Gentium, 25 ALB. L. REV. 299,
303 (1961).
255. Robert C. Beckman, Issues of Public International Law Relating to Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, 3 SING. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 512, 518 (1999).
256. See Editorial, Anti-Piracy Law, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 23, 2009. Japan’s new
antipiracy law now allows Japanese Self-Defense Forces to protect commercial ships,
both Japanese and non-Japanese, from pirates operating beyond Japanese waters. See
id. (“The Diet has enacted a law that will enable the dispatch of [Japanese] Forces . . .
any time and anywhere in the world.”).
257. Zou Keyuan, Issues of Public International Law Relating to the Crackdown of Piracy
in the South China Sea and Prospects for Regional Cooperation, 3 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
524, 535 (1999).
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incidents of piracy. Clearly, the improvement of domestic laws,
especially those pertaining to jurisdiction over piracy, is vital to
ensuring an effective enforcement regime.
A. Regional Enforcement of Piracy Law
The idea of regional cooperation is certainly not new, and many
successes have been realized as a result of such cooperation in areas
such as human rights, security, and trade. Therefore, previous efforts
to cooperate on a regional level may be worth emulating in order to
combat other threats that are both regional and international in
nature. The U.N. Charter underscores the importance of regional
258
cooperation. Regionalism may have thrived in the past due to the
conditions of the Cold War, and although it is certainly not
259
flourishing today, its many advantages have kept the concept alive.
In targeting the specific problem of piracy, the U.N. Security Council
has accentuated the importance of regional cooperation in some of
its resolutions. For example, the Council called on “States, [and]
regional and international organizations that have the capacity to do
so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery
at sea off the coast of Somalia,” and encouraged “all States and
regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the coast of Somalia to consider creating a centre in the region to
coordinate information relevant to piracy and armed robbery at sea
260
off the coast of Somalia.”
Hot pursuit is one area in particular that could significantly benefit
from increased regional enforcement. Hot pursuits often begin in
the “internal waters, territorial waters, contiguous zones or the EEZs
261
of the coastal states.”
But the right to pursue ends as soon as a
262
chase enters the territorial waters of a third state.
Regional
cooperation could remedy this and other problems associated with
piracy. As the Secretary General of the IMO remarked:

258. See generally U.N. Charter arts. 52–54 (encouraging the development of
regional arrangements).
259. Regional cooperation is based on factors such as social and cultural
homogeneity, similarity of attitudes and social patterns of behavior, common goals,
political and/or economic interdependence, and strong geographical contiguity,
among others. Eibe Reidel, The Progressive Development of International Law at the
Universal and Regional Level, in STRENGTHENING THE WORLD ORDER: UNIVERSALISM V.
REGIONALISM 115, 132 (1990). Regional arrangements carry greater global legitimacy
than do global arrangements because they are less likely to be seen as impositions.
260. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1.
261. Keyuan, supra note 257, at 538.
262. Id.
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Looking to the future, it seems clear to me that . . . the long-term
solution to the problem of piracy and armed robbery off the coast
of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden . . . should be looked for within
the region itself. Strong and coordinated coast guard and law
enforcement capabilities; appropriate and workable legal
provisions so that the perpetrators of the crime of piracy do not
escape with impunity for their acts . . . [—]all these are necessary if
the rule of law is to hold sway . . . [and] most of them are currently
263
missing from Somalia and the adjacent region.

Regional cooperation can help states avoid potential jurisdictional
conflicts and can reduce costs. Furthermore, a legal framework for
regional cooperation is already in place. Article 123 of the UNCLOS
provides a basis for state parties to the treaty to cooperate in the
264
suppression of piracy.
B. Effective Strategies
South East Asia stands out as a success story of how regionalism can
be used to combat piracy. Sixteen nations in that region signed the
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
265
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) —the first treaty dedicated
solely to combating piracy—following a spate of incidents of piracy in
the area. The agreement obligates signatory parties to extradite
pirates who are present in their territories to the territories of other
266
Perhaps it is now time for
signatory parties upon their request.
other regions to adopt similar regional agreements to combat piracy.
However, it is important to point out that based on statistics compiled
by the IMO—including South East Asia where regional cooperation
was implemented and every country in that region made piracy a
punishable crime—the results were modest and failed to reduce
267
piratical acts in any substantial manner.
The UNCLOS provides that “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the
fullest extent possible in the repression of piracy on the high seas . . .
268
269
.”
This may include the creation of regional agreements.
The
IMO has concluded that “[r]egional cooperation among States has
an important role to play in solving the problem of piracy and armed
263. Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, Secretary-General, International Maritime
Organization, Welcoming Remarks (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.imo.org/
newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1774&doc_id=11124.
264. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 123.
265. Apr. 28, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 829 [hereinafter ReCAAP].
266. Id. art. 12.
267. Jesus, supra note 109, at 369.
268. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 100.
269. Id. art. 311, ¶ 3.
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robbery against ships, as evidenced by the success of the regional anti270
piracy operation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.”
Accordingly, the IMO sought to replicate the successes in South East
Asia by facilitating regional cooperation in Somalia, the Gulf of Aden,
271
and the Gulf of Guinea to combat contemporary piracy. In January,
2009, the IMO facilitated the adoption of an important regional
272
agreement in Djibouti among states in the region.
The regional
cooperation resulted in the creation of the Code of Conduct
Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, an
agreement that recognizes the extent of the problem of piracy and
273
In the agreement,
armed robbery against ships in the region.
signatories declared their intention to cooperate to the fullest
possible extent, in a manner consistent with international law, in the
274
repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Significantly,
the signatories agreed to commit themselves, among other things, to
“ensuring that persons committing or attempting to commit acts of
piracy or armed robbery against ships are apprehended and
275
prosecuted.”
As one commentator noted:
Seeking to replicate the success of ReCAAP, the IMO sponsored
meetings in Tanzania and Djibouti to reach an agreement among
the regional states of the Horn of Africa for developing a treaty
against piracy in the western Indian Ocean. Once an agreement is
reached among the States of East Africa, the maritime nations
would embark on a program to build capacity for investigative and
judicial action. If nations in East Africa develop the legal
architecture to deal with piracy, including lawyers, courtrooms and
confinement facilities, they would be more willing and better able
276
to enforce the maritime rule of law in the western Indian Ocean.

Replicating the South East Asian experiment, however, in East
Africa or the other regions of Africa, where geographical, economic,
270. Int’l Maritime Org., Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,
http://www.imo.org (follow “Facilitation” hyperlink; then follow “Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships” hyperlink) (last visited June 3, 2010).
271. See Int’l Maritime Org., Piracy in Waters off the Coast of Somalia,
http://www.imo.org (follow “Facilitation” hyperlink; then follow “Piracy and armed
robbery against ships” hyperlink; then follow “Piracy in waters off the coast of
Somalia” hyperlink) (last visited June 3, 2010).
272. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 108, ¶ 9.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Piracy in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, supra note 271.
276. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law, 40 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 43, 54–55 (2009).
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and social conditions are vastly different from South East Asia, would
be extremely difficult. Compared to the South East Asia region, the
African region faces dire economic and structural challenges,
including the fact that the South East Asia cooperation efforts were
277
led by Japan—an economic powerhouse.
Although there is no
similar power in East Africa, the pooling of resources and
278
international assistance might help.
Another distinction between the South East Asia region and East
Africa region is the fact that the economies of all sixteen countries in
South East Asia depend on maritime trade. Perhaps African
countries, especially those without a significant shipping operation,
might not see the urgency in developing a regional treaty for
combating piracy. Indeed, given the poverty problem and other
internal problems faced by many African states, it is unlikely that such
states would individually or collectively devote significant time or
279
resources to the fight against piracy.
The African Union has tried
to pay attention to maritime trade, and to the extent that the
continent is interested, has begun to build a framework to enforce
280
piracy law on a regional level. The African Union’s Contact Group
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) met in Cairo on March
16, 2009, and observed that
[n]eighboring States can play an essential role in addressing the
phenomenon of piracy off the Somali coast. That role may include

277. GROUP 4 OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA,
IMPROVING DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION EFFORTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF PIRACY 3,
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/UA/Conferences/2009/mars/PSC/
16MARSBIS/CGPCS_WG%204.pdf (last visited June 3, 2010) [hereinafter WORKING
GROUP 4] (noting that the primary causes of piracy off the Somali coast are the
fragile political and security situation in the area along with the poor economic
conditions).
278. In June 2009, the Somali transitional federal government established a new
navy, in part, to combat piracy off its coast. Analysts Skeptical New Somali Navy Can
Fight Piracy, VOANEWS.COM, June 18, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/
archive/2009-06/2009-06-18voa34.cfm?CFID=279231309&CFTOKEN=27674671&jsessionid=0030d599e2410ad57
1f6387e20796b56312d. But analysts observed that the real priority of the fledgling
administration was to fight “for its survival against al-Shabab,” and they predicted that
the administration’s focus would be “fighting the war on land.” Id. It is unrealistic to
expect such a government to raise a competent navy at a time when it is struggling
for its very survival. Id.
279. See id. (expressing doubt as to Somalia’s likelihood of success with respect to
its efforts to end piracy because the country neglects its naval facilities and lacks
experienced sailors and ships, especially with the near-daily battles between the U.N.backed government and al-Qaida-linked militant groups).
280. WORKING GROUP 4, supra note 277, at 1 (explaining that the objective of the
African Union’s Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia is to establish “a
wide public information campaign that includes outreach activities such as seminars
and workshops and a coordinated media strategy”).
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. . . sending a message to potential pirates that their territories will
not act as a safe haven for pirates or a destination for the proceeds
of piracy. They may also cooperate through joint training of their
Coast Guards, and the harmonization of legislation governing
piracy and armed robbery against ships to prevent impunity for
281
pirates . . . .

The United Nations has also pointed to efforts by the League of
Arab States—a region that is arguably better financially resourced
than the East Africa region. A report by the U.N. Secretary General
noted that “[t]he League of Arab States held an extraordinary session
of the Arab Peace and Security Council in Cairo on November 4,
2008 to examine the issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
282
coast of Somalia.”
The meeting called for closer cooperation and
exchange of information between Arab States and relevant
283
organizations like the IMO.
As one commentator has noted, “the
Somali crisis has been entangled with complex regional conflict,
which includes the Ethiopian-Eritrean impasse, the insurgency and
counter-insurgency in the Ethiopia-Somali region, and the longrunning tensions between Ethiopian and Somali security interests
284
and territorial claims.”
C. Comprehensive Approaches with a Focus on Somalia
Legal solutions are important, but they need to be augmented with
broader solutions that tackle the underlying causes of piracy. The
U.N. Secretary General spoke of the need to “be mindful that piracy
is a symptom of the state of anarchy which has persisted in [Somalia]
for over 17 years” and that “anti-piracy efforts must be placed in the
context of a comprehensive approach which fosters an inclusive
peace process in Somalia and assists the parties to rebuild security
285
[and] governance capacity. . . .”
The Somalis argue that piracy
provides one of the only means of sustenance in dire humanitarian
286
circumstances.
The rise in Somali piracy correlates with the
incompetence of Somalia’s weak central government, the conditions
of the country’s impoverished and stagnant economy, and the failure
281. Id. ¶ 2.
282. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 108, ¶ 9.
283. Id. ¶ 9.
284. Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable Strategy for Somalia Before the Subcomm.
on African Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 17 (2009) (statement
of Dr. Ken Menkhaus, Professor of Political Science, Davidson College).
285. Piracy Problem Inseparable from Overall Somali Crisis, Ban Warns, UN NEWS
CENTRE, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.un. org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29334&Cr
=somalia&Cr1=piracy.
286. Avast!, supra note 137, at 5.
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of the international community to hold pirates accountable for their
287
In fact, Somalia has not had an effective and functioning
actions.
288
central government since 1991. According to U.N. officials, piracy
near Somalia began as a violent reaction to rampant illegal fishing by
commercial fishing companies, mostly from European and Asian
289
countries, which often operated with fake licenses. Some have even
attempted to justify piracy on the ground that it is the only feasible
response to the intractable and inequitable economic world and the
290
lingering effects of colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.
Despite these justifications, the United Nations has “[e]mphasiz[ed]
that peace and stability, the strengthening of State institutions,
economic and social development and respect for human rights and
the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a full
291
eradication of piracy.”
Because piracy has political, economic, security, and
humanitarian dimensions, the international response must be
similarly comprehensive and multifaceted. There certainly is a need
to address the socioeconomic root causes of piracy and a need to
292
tackle this issue through a comprehensive approach. The example
of Somalia, where pirates share multi-million-dollar ransoms in an

287. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 276, at 44 (“Piracy seldom takes place in
isolation, frequently occurring in concert with severe poverty, weak or no governance
and economic stagnation. Piracy is experiencing a renaissance, in part, because of
the dire situation within Somalia. The average annual income is estimated to be
$650. One attack can yield $10,000 for a working-level pirate. It is not surprising
that at least 1,400 Somali men are associated with organized criminal gangs that are
engaged in piracy. A pirate leader said, ‘When evil is the only solution, you do
evil.’”); see also Bahar, supra note 2, at 19 (“Since 1991, Somalia has had no
functioning government, no real laws, and no enforcement power. When asked why
he and his compatriots were caught with weapons, one of the ten suspected Somali
pirates simply responded to me, ‘I am Somali; the gun is our government.’”).
288. Bahar, supra note 2, at 19.
289. Stephanie McCrummen, Somalia’s Godfathers: Ransom-Rich Pirates, WASH.
POST, Apr. 20, 2009, at A1, A8 (explaining that the foreign fishing vessels’ crews
would spray Somali fishing vessels with hot water and bullets, sinking their boats
and/or injuring some of them, and that it was in response to such show of force that
Somali fishermen started to carry AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades
and took ransom in order to attend to the wounded).
290. Piracy has not always had a negative connotation. See, e.g., A.T. Whatley,
Historical Sketch of the Law of Piracy, 3 LAW MAG. & REV. 536, 536–37 (1874) (observing
that “[a]mong the ancients . . . [s]o far from being a disgrace, and an illegal
occupation, [piracy] was considered an honourable calling,” until international
commerce grew and, with it, the necessity to protect it).
291. S.C. Res. 1838, supra note 196; S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 197.
292. See WORKING GROUP 4, supra note 277, at 1–4 (recommending the
establishment of a public information campaign, the development of diplomatic
efforts to bring political and security stability to Somalia, and the strengthening of
the fishing industry as parts of a multi-pronged solution to piracy).
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293

impoverished and war-torn country, calls for a complete and
multilevel approach, one that must first include setting up a viable
state in Somalia with naval capabilities. Recently, the Somali
transitional government has urged the international community to
help Somalia build up its own navy as a “final solution” to the
294
Yet, even if the international efforts to patrol
problem of piracy.
the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean were effective, which some
295
reports refute, such efforts present only a short-term solution.
Ultimately, the solution lies with the Somali state. Nevertheless, the
idea that the solution lies entirely within the creation of a Somali navy
is misguided. Somalia is a country that, at present, does not even
have a viable military to support the transitional government. The
country must instead rely on foreign troops for stability.
296
Currently, Somalia epitomizes the piracy problem,
but the
297
problem is by no means limited to that region, nor is it a new
298
phenomenon.
For example, pirates operating off the Nigerian
coast operate, in part, because of the political insurgency in the Niger
299
These rebels claim to have engaged in piracy to promote
Delta.
their political goals and to push the government toward equitable
300
distribution of profits from the oil industry.

293. Katharine Houreld, Somali Pirates Seize Chinese Ship with 25 Crew, ABC NEWS,
Oct. 19, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8861410.
294. Zhang Haizhou, Piracy Solution Is New Somali Navy, Says Ambassador,
CHINADAILY.COM.CN, Apr. 4, 2009, http://chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-04/24/
content_7710730.htm.
295. See id. (noting that some international warships are patrolling irresponsibly,
which is encouraging pirates to attack more ships).
296. In its 2008 annual report, the IMO noted that the areas most affected by
piracy were East Africa and the Far East, in particular the South China Sea, West
Africa, South America and the Caribbean, and the Indian Ocean. IMO ANNUAL
REPORT 2008, supra note 135, ¶ 5. Over the period under review, the number of acts
reported to have occurred or to have been attempted increased from 67 to 72 in the
South China Sea and from 60 to 134 in East Africa. Id. There was a decrease, over
the 2007 figures, from 60 to 50 in West Africa, from 40 to 26 in the Indian Ocean,
from 12 to 2 in the Malacca Strait, from 25 to 19 in South America and the
Caribbean, and from 7 to 1 in the Arabian Sea. Id. This represented an annual
increase of nearly 200 percent in the critical trade corridor linking the Suez Canal
and the Indian Ocean. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 108, ¶ 4.
297. See International Maritime Bureau, International Chamber of Commerce,
Unprecedented Rise in Piratical Attacks, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.icc-ccs.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=306:unprecedented-rise-inpiratical-attacks&catid=60:news&It emid=51) (“Somalia, Nigeria, and Indonesia
remain[ed] international piracy hotspots, ranking first, second and third in acts of
piracy up to the end of [the third quarter of] 2008.”).
298. In the 1990s, this piracy was concentrated in South Eastern Asia, which at the
time was experiencing a deep economic crisis. Barrios, supra note 101, at 150.
299. Avast!, supra note 137, at 5.
300. Id. In United States v. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1885), a U.S.
District Court enforced piracy provisions against insurgents who were recognized to
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given how long and arduous a task it is to amend an international
treaty, it would be easier to add a protocol to the UNCLOS that
would provide both for the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
ITLOS to include the prosecution of the crime of piracy and for the
creation of regional courts where necessary. Ad hoc U.N. resolutions
can be helpful in specific situations and as temporary solutions. In
the long-term, however, it may well be necessary to adopt an
additional protocol to the ITLOS that deals specifically with the
problem of piracy as a means to enhance the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over individual access to the court. Such expanded
jurisdiction should also extend to cases where pirates are caught in
territorial waters off the coastal state, and when the central authority
of a particular state is dysfunctional or non-existent. Article 311,
paragraph 3 of UNCLOS envisages such amendments. The UNCLOS
could also be amended to expressly provide for situations where
301
countries are either unwilling or unable to prosecute pirates.
Enforcement measures should also address the possibility of cases
brought “before the [t]ribunal . . . in the form of a complaint
submitted by one State against another, accusing the defending State
302
of not doing enough to combat piracy.”
On this point, because
states are unlikely to sue each other, the United Nations can seek
advisory opinions from the ITLOS regarding enforcement issues
303
related to piracy.
Along similar lines, the President of the ITLOS
has argued that “[a]s the international community faces new
challenges in ocean activities, such as piracy and armed robbery,
advisory proceedings before the Tribunal on legal questions
concerning the application and interpretation of provisions of the
304
Convention may prove to be a useful tool to States.”

have been fighting for political independence, though their actions were not carried
out for private ends. Id. at 412–13.
301. Consider, for instance, the Straits of Malacca. The coastal states have “laws
and effective governments[,] [as well as] the will to enforce the laws, but the
hundreds of miles of coastline and numerous uninhabited islands make maritime law
enforcement [prohibitively costly].” Bahar, supra note 2, at 20. Furthermore,
navies—like the Indonesian Navy—are old and inefficient. Id.
302. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Former President, Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Statement Given at the Übersee-Club, Hamburg: The Value for Hamburg of the
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea—Profile, Expectations and Reality (Feb. 27, 2008),
(transcript available at http://www.itlos.org).
303. Jesus, supra note 239, ¶¶ 8–9.
304. Id.
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Amendments to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas have
been proposed, but they were not adopted because it was felt at the
306
time of the proposals that piracy was not a pressing problem.
Clearly, this is no longer the case. One possible step that could be
taken could be the elaboration of an international code on piracy,
which could then be incorporated into the domestic legislation of the
states that are parties to the treaty. The lack of a comprehensive
legislative framework has prevented some countries from adequately
307
punishing pirates after they were convicted. An international code
could help to harmonize several important legal structures on an
international level, including procedures for exercising jurisdiction
during the investigation of reported instances of piracy, standards of
punishment for pirates, and an extradition scheme for dealing with
308
accused pirates.
In order to counter piracy more expeditiously, the definition of
piracy should be expanded to include violence that takes place in
309
territorial waters. This definition would enable states to engage in
hot pursuit of pirates into the territorial waters of third states as long
as the pursuing state respected that state’s sovereignty by providing
310
notice of pursuit to the coastal state.
Since the U.N. Security
Council has demonstrated that it views piracy as a serious crime by
311
designating it as a threat to international peace and security —a
designation also given to terrorism—it would not be a huge
departure for the Council to extend the far-reaching geographical
scope of antiterrorism rules so that they apply to the rules against

305. Prior to the ratification of the Convention in 1958, a Committee of Experts
for the Progressive Codification of International Law of the League of Nations also
had proposed in Article 5 of the 1926 draft articles on the codification of piracy rules
that “a pursuit commenced in the high seas may be continued even within the
territorial waters unless the territorial State is in a position to continue such pursuit
itself.” Jesus, supra note 109, at 386 (citations omitted).
306. Id.
307. Press Release, Int’l Maritime Org., Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships—Call for International Code (May 13, 1999), http://www.imo.org
(follow “Newsroom” hyperlink; then follow “Press Briefings” hyperlink; then follow
“Archives—1999 Press Briefings” hyperlink).
308. Id.
309. See Dubner, supra note 133, at 33–34 (explaining that “most of the human
rights violations and losses to commercial shipping occur . . . in territorial waters,”
which escapes enforcement due to the coastal state’s lack of desire to stop the acts,
unless the definition is expanded).
310. Id. at 37–38.
311. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1838, supra note 196. In Resolution 1844, the Council
recognized “the role piracy may play in financing embargo violations by armed
groups” and concluded that “the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat
to international peace and security in the region.” S.C. Res. 1844, Preamble, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008).
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piracy. This change could be enacted without interfering with the
sovereignty of the coastal state simply by amending the definition of
piracy in the UNCLOS to include territorial waters.
Alternatively, instead of modifying the current definition of piracy,
a different course of action could be used to formulate a whole new
offense that would capture private acts at sea perpetrated for political
312
or terrorist objectives—as was done for aircraft hijacking.
The
advantages of formulating a new offense to fit the contemporary
threat include a better description of the crime, a better description
of the gravity of the offense, and a better tailored penalty. However,
in international law, the process of adopting a new international
313
Modification of the UNCLOS is
agreement is an arduous task.
provided for under Article 311, which states that “[t]wo or more
States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the
operation of provisions of this Convention, applicably solely to the
314
relations between them.”
As many commentators have suggested, one of the greatest possible
reforms would be for international rules on piracy to “extend the
regime of piracy to territorial waters,” but in such a way that a coastal
315
state’s sovereignty would continue to be respected.
The U.N.
Security Council resolutions that permitted several international
actors to enter Somalia’s territorial waters indicate that this is
possible. Although the Council has broadened the powers of all
nations patrolling the Gulf of Aden to pursue pirates and bring them
316
to justice, there has so far been no activity in the courts.
To
improve enforcement of the laws against piracy, the right of hot
pursuit should extend to territorial waters and to the exclusive
economic zone.
The limitation imposed by the hot pursuit rules that prevents the
capture of suspected pirates should be modified in light of current
communications technology. Now, it is possible for an ensnared
vessel to inform the coastal state that it is under attack and that it is
appealing to its national or flag state to exercise its jurisdiction and
312. See Kavanagh, supra note 111, at 138 (explaining how the 1970 Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft paved the way for the
1988 SUA Convention).
313. Id. at 137 n.52 (explaining that the delegates of the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea faced difficulties when they tried to agree “on an acceptable
definition of piracy when there were in existence a variety of municipal legal
traditions on the law of piracy”).
314. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 311, ¶ 3.
315. Jesus, supra note 109, at 382.
316. Douglas S. Malan, Maritime Attorneys Deal with High Seas Piracy, LAW.COM, Apr.
24, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sfb/lawArticleSFB.jsp?id=1202430155573.
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protect it, unless the Council later determines that the coastal state
is willing and capable of acting on its own.
The lack of universal jurisdiction for acts of piracy committed in
318
territorial waters is also particularly deserving of attention.
Capturing states or the ITLOS should be able to prosecute suspected
pirates regardless of where the capture was accomplished, as long as
there are reasonable grounds to believe that piracy was being or was
319
about to be committed.
Some commentators have suggested that
foreign warships should be allowed to continue their hot pursuit into
territorial waters so that pirates cannot easily evade capture and
prosecution simply because they have been able to enter the
320
territorial waters of another country. This should be the case even
when the capture is not a result of hot pursuit. In order to protect
the sovereignty of the coastal state, it would be necessary to
communicate with the coastal state before engaging the suspected
pirates. States should have the option to allow the coastal state to
prosecute or extradite the suspected pirates captured in their
territorial waters, subject to action by the U.N. Security Council in
cases of noncompliance.
The alternative procedure under Article 313 of the UNCLOS,
however, may be more appealing. Under Article 313, the U.N.
Secretary General may circulate a proposed amendment to all state
321
parties, without requiring a conference. The only hurdle is that if a
state party, within a period of twelve months from the date of that
circulation, objects to the proposed amendment, the amendment is
322
considered rejected.
Since the absence of any objection may very
well be an unrealistic proposition, it is possible for two or more state
317. See, e.g., United States v. Conroy, 589 F. 2d 1258, 1267–68 (1979) (upholding
a U.S. Coast Guard enforcement action in the Haitian territorial sea with Haiti’s
consent).
318. But see Bahar, supra note 2, at 15 (arguing that “[u]niversal jurisdiction
actually solves the problem of enforcement”). Bahar also notes that any hopes of
closing the gap posed by a lack of international enforcement within territorial waters
is “improbable” and that, in any case, it is “inadvisable” since the harmed state can
seek redress through diplomatic and military channels. Id. at 16–17. This argument
is based on respect for national sovereignty. Id. The argument, however, presumes
that there is a functioning state with which another state can deal, and that national
sovereignty is absolute, a presumption which, under the U.N. Charter, is incorrect in
situations where international peace and security are threatened. Militarization of
efforts to combat piracy would seem to undermine international law that aims to
resolve disputes through peaceful means.
319. Jesus, supra note 109, at 386–87 (arguing for the implementation of an
extradition and prosecution clause where alleged pirates escape into the territory of
a country that cannot prosecute them).
320. Id. at 383–84.
321. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 313, ¶ 1.
322. Id. ¶ 2.
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parties to agree on a bilateral or multilateral suspension or
modification of the UNCLOS as long as they follow the conditions
laid down by the UNCLOS, which states:
Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or
suspending the operation of provisions of this Convention,
applicable solely to the relations between them, provided that such
agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from which is
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and
purpose of this Convention, and provided further that such
agreements shall not affect the application of the basic principles
embodied herein, and that the provisions of such agreements do
not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or
323
performance of their obligations under this Convention.

Instead of creating new regional organizations, especially in a
resource-starved continent such as Africa, consideration should be
given to linking regional cooperation for piracy suppression to
324
existing regional arrangements such as the African Union.
This
could be accomplished with the enactment of an agreement under
325
the auspices of the African Union. It is, after all, in the interest of
the African Union to have safe waters surrounding its continent. The
African Court of Justice could establish chambers to prosecute
suspected pirates with complementary jurisdiction to domestic
326
jurisdiction. These efforts could very well allay fears that the ITLOS
would be overwhelmed by piracy cases.
Regarding enforcement and regional cooperation, waiver of
jurisdiction by the flag state should hinge solely upon its willingness
327
or ability to exercise jurisdiction. Thus, if the flag state fails to waive

323. Id. art. 311, ¶ 3.
324. See Timothy H. Goodman, Note, “Leaving the Corsair’s Name to Other Times”:
How to Enforce the Law of Sea Piracy in the 21st Century Through Regional International
Agreements, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 139, 162–63 (1999) (listing the economic
community of the West African states and the Preferential Trade Area as examples of
African multilateral regional agreements).
325. The adoption of the African Maritime Transport Charter in 1994 under the
auspices of the African Union is a positive development in the right direction
demonstrating that African States are interested not only in taking an active part in
maritime trade but also in protecting such trade as well. African Maritime Transport
Charter, Dec. 15, 1993, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/
Documents/Treaties/Text/AFRICAN_MARITIME_TRANSPORT.pdf. However, this
Charter does not mention piracy.
326. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights is empowered to interpret
and apply treaties adopted within the framework of the African Union. See Protocol
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 28(b), Jul. 1,
2008, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/
Protocol%20on%20the%20Merged%20Court%20-%20EN.pdf.
327. See INT’L MARITIME ORG., PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS FOR PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING PIRACY AND
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jurisdiction, either because it is unwilling or unable to do so, in
certain cases the U.N. Security Council should be able to intervene
and suspend such rights of the flag state without having to wait for
that waiver.
The domestic courts must be equipped as necessary to ensure that
they have the ability to adequately implement the relevant law. This
should begin with accelerated stabilization of regions which have
pirate-infested waters. Once such regions are stable, it would be
possible to enact and enforce laws relating to pirates or to extradite
pirates for prosecution elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
In sum, a review of the international law on piracy shows that the
rules need to be updated to better combat crime on the high seas.
Such updates should include the amendment of jurisdiction in
Exclusive Economic Zones, territorial waters, and the archipelagic
waters, and should not jeopardize the sovereignty of coastal states.
Reform also requires the creation of a robust system of enforcement
at the international level that is permanent and that measures up to
the unique challenges of contemporary sea piracy. As in the case of
the law of war, where hot pursuit is permitted, it should likewise be
possible for a state to intrude into waters within the jurisdictional
sovereignty of a coastal State as long as it has permission and can
demonstrate sufficient cause for doing so.
Stand-alone strategies for dealing with piracy have been repeatedly
undermined by other national and regional dynamics, which is why it
is essential to look for broader approaches to the piracy problem.
Turning to an international tribunal such as the ITLOS is one such
approach. By expanding the definition of piracy and by extending
the jurisdiction of the ITLOS to include piracy, the prosecution of
suspected pirates should be made more feasible. Yet, even as
significant normative and enforcement mechanisms are created,
sufficient attention must be given to the root causes of piracy, which
could likely be combated with the strengthening a country’s central
government and with the establishment of a secure and peaceful
society.

ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS (MSC.1/Circ.1333 ) 21 (June 26, 2009), available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_ id%3D25884/1333.pdf.

